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ABSTRACT 
This research demonstrates how the building of Interorganizational Collaborative 
Capacity served as an enabler for effective change efforts in Florida and constructs a 
narrative describing smart practices that may be leveraged by other professionals to 
enhance their own interorganizational collaborative capacity and efficiency efforts.  
Florida is viewed by many professionals as one of the best-prepared states in the field of 
emergency management.  It built a credible reputation over the past 20 years through 
increasingly effective responses to catastrophic hurricanes, floods, tornados, wildfires, 
tropical storms and environmental threats.  In particular, the Florida State Emergency 
Response Team evolved during this time as a result of many change efforts following the 
initial response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, an event viewed by many as the initial 
starting point for the creation of the modern Florida emergency management era.  This 
research examines Florida’s Comprehensive Disaster Management evolution from 1992 
to 2004 using after-action reports for major emergency events utilizing Hocevar, Thomas 
and Jansen’s model of Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity and focuses on the 
factors that served as catalysts for increased interagency cooperation and efficiency.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
This research examines the need for the building and/or strengthening of 
collaborative capacity within the homeland security enterprise, with specific focus on the 
state of Florida’s Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) Enterprise.  While 
acknowledging that any homeland security effort could benefit from assessing its 
collaborative capacity, this study’s specific focus is Florida’s State Emergency Response 
Team (F-SERT).  Cooperative collaboration within Homeland Security is about 
organizational effectiveness in protecting American national interests.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 81 states that strengthening information sharing and 
collaboration capabilities is a national priority. This directive emphasizes the need for 
this research effort into organizational factors that might enable information sharing and 
collaborative efforts. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
American homeland security is still a relatively new discipline.  This is especially 
true at the state and local levels, where time is required to formulate guidance in line with 
homeland security federal directives and programs.  The task of protecting America from 
invasion and subversion has been a daunting endeavor for the nation since its inception. 
The twenty-first century has produced new security challenges and threats as a result of 
extreme weather patterns, emerging technological advances, an evolving organizational 
framework designed to counter threats to the national interest, economic instability and 
violent extremism.  Homeland security success is paramount for future generations—it is 
a national and state security imperative.  The homeland security enterprise is a 
consortium of organizations that requires maintenance and sometimes organizational 
development intervention to flourish and reach a state of excellence.  Similar to many 
experiences in life, homeland security may be viewed as a journey and not a destination. 
                                                 
1 United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Presidential Directive 8: National 
Preparedness (Washington, DC: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
 2 
American homeland security has made great strides over the past 10 years but 
state and federal intra- and inter-agency efforts still experience organizational friction. 
Organizational friction may be defined by combining the definitions of organization and 
friction. Organization is defined as 1) a group of people identified by a shared interest or 
purpose, or 2) the coordinating of separate components into a unit or structure.2 Friction 
is defined as a disagreement or conflict, stopping short of violence, between people, 
groups, or nations with differing objectives or views.3  Another shorter definition of 
friction is the clashing between two persons or parties of opposed views.4  Agencies that 
now comprise American homeland security, historically operated within their own 
organizational cultures and established unique organizational “brands.”  With the 
establishment of U.S. Homeland Security, these same organizations have been directed to 
operate outside their historical spheres of influence, collaborate with one another, and 
increase information sharing with other agencies. The addition of new agencies to the 
homeland security enterprise—while enhancing capabilities—has increased the 
probability of greater organizational friction.   
Organizational friction impedes the effectiveness of building collaborative 
capacity—a necessary and vital component of effective homeland security.  Getha-Taylor 
(2008) notes that “the Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated collaboration as the 
necessary mechanism for accomplishing the complex and critical mission of protecting 
the American people.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created as 
part of this Act but collaboration success still seems elusive in many instances.  Part of 
this problem may be attributed to a potential lack of collaborative capacity among DHS 
organizations as identified by such scholars as Goodman et al. (1998) and Bardach (1998,  
 
 
                                                 
2 MSN Encarta Dictionary, Organization, 2010, 
http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861684837_1861684837/prevpage.html (accessed November 3, 2010). 
3 MSN Encarta Dictionary, Friction, 2010, 
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?lextype=3&search=friction 
(accessed November 3, 2010). 
4 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Friction, 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/friction 
(accessed November 3, 2010). 
 3 
2001).  These scholars describe the capacity to collaborate being built among such 
components as trust, communication, intellectual capital, creative opportunity, acceptance 
of leadership and learning.”5  
The cost of organizational friction can be measured in financial terms, due to 
organizational inefficiencies, and in potential security failures leading to additional 
damage and loss of life.  Also of concern is the decrease in the public's confidence in the 
government’s ability to operate efficiently to provide acceptable levels of security.  
Inefficiency in government affects morale, which impacts adversely on the ability to 
complete the organization’s mission, leading to more decline in efficiency and 
organizational creativity.  Organizations and individuals may become protective of their 
turf and defensive in their activities, which may cause increased stove-piping of 
information. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What do lessons learned tell us about the development of collaborative capability 
for the Florida Comprehensive Disaster Management Enterprise? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• What success factors enable collaborative capacity? 
• What organizational frictions (restraining factors) inhibit collaborative 
capability?  
• What smart practices (enablers) contribute to effective collaborative 
capability? 
• What methodologies, tools and training were used to build collaborative 
capacity within the Florida CDM enterprise?    
                                                 
5 Getha-Taylor, Heather, “Learning Indicators and Collaborative Capacity: Applying Action Learning 
Principles to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,” Public Administration Quarterly 32, no. 2 
(2008): 125–146, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/business/docview/226969112/13051E1667C4668ED1E/2?acc
ountid=12702 (accessed July 2, 2011). 
 4 
D. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Interagency collaboration is an enabler for successful homeland security efforts 
within the United States.  The United States Army Leadership Field Manuel 6-22 
discusses the importance of creating a common vision to create successful teams—“the 
key element of extending influence and building teams is the creation of a common 
vision among prospective team members.”6 This project seeks to enable the continuation 
of a collective state of Florida CDM vision by collecting and disseminating research from 
past efforts across the continuum of the past 20 years of Florida homeland security and 
emergency management efforts.  Documenting smart practices facilitates a future 
emphasis on building collaborative capacity efforts and may also assist in the 
development of future Florida CDM values.   
One of the major means for building collaborative capacity within the Florida 
SERT organization is through collaborative learning.  Existing research in collaborative 
learning supports this premise statement. Bardach states that “learning has been identified 
as an important component of collaborative capacity.” 7 Donoghue and Tuohy noted, in a 
2006 study of disaster after-action reports and lessons learned, retrieved from a range of 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the 9-11 attacks, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing 
and Hurricane Andrew that “perhaps the key mechanism for testing, practicing, refining 
and inculcating new lessons-derived behavior is exercising.  Almost every After-Action 
Review (AAR) discussed the critical role that training and exercising play in building 
capacity.”8 This project seeks to shape the strategic environment for further development 
of the Florida State Emergency Response Team (F-SERT) by linking its past, present and 
future endeavors.    
The F-SERT is an intra-agency unit comprised of single agency resources to 
include human resources and equipment.  Its success or failure depends on collaborative 
                                                 
6 United States Army, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile, 7–22, October 12, 2006, 
http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Readings/fm6-22.pdf (accessed January 22, 2011). 
7 Getha-Taylor, “Learning Indicators and Collaborative Capacity,” 125. 
8 Donoghue, Amy K. & Tuohy, Robert V., “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study if the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 2 
(2006). 
 5 
efforts between the various participating governmental and non-governmental agencies at 
the federal, state and local levels as well as with the Florida population that it is designed 
to support.  The inherent risk of not collaborating includes the dynamic of stove-piping 
information related to successful efforts within individual agencies as the forces of 
competing organizational cultures lead to competition for available resources.     
This project does not seek to rank individual agency efforts against other 
agencies’ efforts; it is assumed that each effort contains its own unique challenges due to 
its distinctive circumstances and that each agency’s overall mission contributes to 
collective Florida SERT success.  A premise of this project is that a systems approach to 
examining interagency mission success will provide clues that complete the entire puzzle 
and strengthen the effort within the broader context of the Florida homeland security 
enterprise.  It is further supposed that this narrative of what success looks like, within the 
state of Florida, will strengthen other state and federal agency efforts within the broader 
homeland security enterprise.        
Training is essential for the homeland security enterprise to be successful.  A 
premise of this project is that homeland security training should include organizational 
development training methodologies as part of the program.  Since homeland security 
focuses on many asymmetrical threats, it is imperative that homeland security 
organizations be flexible and able to adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances.  
Identification of smart practices for collaborative capacity development in the field of 
Florida homeland security efforts may be further applied to the entire homeland security 
enterprise to assist in facilitating collaborative teamwork efforts. 
This research hypothesizes that Lewin’s Force Field Analysis (FFA) method (to 
identify driving forces and restraining forces for the building of collaborative capacity 
within the state of Florida CDM Enterprise) will serve to build tacit knowledge within the 
Florida SERT.  FFA is an analytical tool designed by Lewin to develop a framework for 
looking at situations to identify driving factors moving towards a goal and restraining 
factors blocking movement toward a goal.  This knowledge should enhance the F-
SERT’s leadership ability to strengthen shared values and vision for the Florida CDM 
Enterprise. 
 6 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research attempts to add to the existing literature by expanding on how to 
effectively build collaborative capability, within an organization, with specific emphasis 
on comprehensive disaster management inter-agency organizations.  In today’s homeland 
security environment, the case may be made that most organizations need to build 
collaborative capacity in their CDM portfolio to be truly effective.  Homeland Security 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, released on March 30, 2011, 
states that the directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United 
States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the 
security of the nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and 
catastrophic natural disasters. Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all 
levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens. Everyone 
can contribute to safeguarding the Nation from harm. As such, while this directive is 
intended to galvanize action by the federal government, it is also aimed at facilitating an 
integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.”9 
Whether an organization is a statewide emergency management team, the federal 
homeland security enterprise or a local private company, homeland security and disaster 
response affects most organizations and networks of people at specific periods of their 
existence.  Even a local community’s security can be strengthened by building or 
enhancing collaborative capability.   
 
                                                 
9 DHS, Homeland Security Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD 8: National Preparedness, March 30, 
2011, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm (accessed June 26, 2011). 
 7 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
COMPREHENSIVE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISE 
The Florida Division of Emergency Management is the central hub of Florida’s 
emergency management efforts.  The division is headquartered in the state capital of 
Tallahassee under the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and serves as the state’s 
liaison with federal and local agencies for emergencies of all kinds.  Florida Executive 
Order 80-29 dated April 14, 1980 directed state departments, agencies, offices and units 
of state and local government to develop and implement disaster preparedness plans in 
the event of natural and manmade disasters.10  
Florida has established a consortium of governmental agencies, private 
organizations and non-governmental organizations under the umbrella of the Florida 
State Emergency Response Team (F-SERT). The F-SERT operates under the charter of 
the State of Florida Statute Title XVII Chapter 252—The Emergency Management Act.  
Chapter 252.35 of the Florida statutes mandates that the Florida Division of Emergency 
Management prepare a state comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), 
which shall be integrated into and coordinated with the emergency management plans 
and programs of the Federal Government.  The plan shall be implemented by a 
continuous, integrated comprehensive emergency management program.  The plan must 
contain provisions to ensure that the state is prepared for emergencies and minor, major 
and catastrophic disasters and that the division shall work closely with local governments 
and agencies and organizations with emergency management responsibilities in preparing 
and maintaining the plan. The state comprehensive emergency management plan shall be 
operations oriented.11   
                                                 
10 Mittler, Elliot, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management since Hurricane Andrew (Grant 
CMS-9319422), Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 1997. 
11 Florida Legislature, The 2010 Florida Statutes (including Special Section A), Title XVII Military 
Affairs and Related Matters, Chapter 252, Emergency Management, 2011, 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0200-
0299/0252/Sections/0252.35.html (accessed April 30, 2011).  
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The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) is also headquartered in 
Tallahassee and serves as the lead state agency for domestic security efforts.  In October 
2001, Florida developed the nation’s first comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy12 in 
response to the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States.  This effort—similar to the 
efforts of the Florida State Emergency Response Team for emergency management—
utilized a multi-agency approach that leveraged state and local governments along with 
key private sector partners to develop a multi-agency plan focused on Florida’s goals of 
preparation, prevention, deterrence, preemption, protection, response and recovery from 
terrorist acts.     
Florida’s private citizens’ participation and collaboration in such activities as 
preparedness and evacuations is highly encouraged by the F-SERT through public 
outreach efforts and sharing of hazards information.  The many different stakeholders and 
participants in the fields of Florida’s emergency management and domestic security are 
all part of an interconnected network or complex adaptive system.  There has been 
limited discussion of identifying an overall comprehensive term to identify this 
networked collaborative effort, which has become sophisticated and highly adaptive as a 
result of so many events over the past 20 years.  The term Florida Comprehensive 
Disaster Management Enterprise is introduced in this research project as a means of 
identifying and describing the collaborative systems network of this consortium of 
stakeholders and participants in all-hazards preparedness, response, recovery and 
mitigation efforts across the state.  It is hoped that this descriptive term will stimulate 
further discussion and research to adequately describe this complex phenomenon.  The 
term itself may be modified or built upon by subsequent researchers, leaders or change 
agents but the intent is to provide a term that adequately describes the interorganizational 
collaborative capacity (ICC) of so many networked and dedicated Florida organizations 
and personnel.  
                                                 
12 Florida Domestic Security Oversight Counsel, Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan 2009–
2011, August 5, 2008, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/0aead9bc-20f4-4c4e-86fd-
6bd15df62b38/FloridaDomesticSecurityStrategicPlan2009-2011.aspx (accessed September 21, 2011). 
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After major events such as the Hurricane Andrew response in 1992, the Wildfires 
of 1998 and the Summer of Storms of 2004, Florida has conducted multi-agency review 
committees to capture lessons learned.  Reports were produced by these various 
committees to serve as archives of consolidated lessons learned data for future research 
and study.  These reports serve as the primary research data for this project and are 
discussed in further detail later in this research.      
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mark Bevin at the University of California at Berkley makes the case that the 
creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is in itself a manifestation of an 
attempt to create collaborative capacity building or—as he often refers to it—“joined-up 
governance.”13 Bevin notes that, initially, the main language was that of interagency 
coordination, but it has shifted to denote the whole of government.  He goes on to note 
that the 2004 Homeland Security Strategic Plan explicitly mentions “collaborating and 
coordinating across traditional boundaries, both horizontally (between agencies) and 
vertically (among different levels of government)” with the equally explicit aim of 
creating a “cohesive, capable and service-oriented organization whose cross-cutting 
functions will be optimized” so as to better protect the “nation against threats and 
effectively respond to disasters.”  
This chapter examines the literature related to the building and strengthening of 
collaborative capacity.  To begin, I discuss key aspects of interorganizational 
collaboration (ICC) including the importance of shared values, common ground, trust, 
and organizational culture.  Then, I describe an ICC model of success factors and 
barriers.  Next, I discuss concepts that are particularly relevant to the development of ICC 
over time.  These concepts are the role of leadership, friction (hindrances), creative 
tensions, generative organizational learning, mental models and organizational 
development (theory of constraints, smart practices, and force-field analysis).  I then 
conclude the literature review with a summary of the literature review and what 
conclusions may be drawn from the discussed literature.  
The interactions of individuals, teams, and organizations can be linked for cause 
and effect.  If enough individual interpersonal interaction is positive or negative, then it is 
likely that a correlation, either positive or negative, will be found within the larger 
organizational group intra-agency interactions.  Conversely, a large degree of conflict 
                                                 
13 Bevin, M., Joined-Up Governance and the War on Terror, September 1, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=1T4SKPT_enUS409US417&q=bevir+AND+collaboration (accessed July 2, 2011). 
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within an organization may cause increased amounts of interpersonal conflict.  In the 
context of building ICC—particularly the historical experience of emergency 
management efforts centered on extreme weather events—interpersonal, intra-agency and 
inter-agency conflict and friction exists.   This is of significance when emergencies arise 
since time management becomes even more challenging under complex and time 
sensitive situations; notable examples in recent United States history are the 9-11 attacks 
and major storm landfalls such as Hurricane Katrina. 
A. KEY ASPECTS OF ICC 
Foster-Fishman et al. 14 note in their qualitative analysis of 80 articles, chapters 
and practitioner guides that collaborative capacity is built through three primary areas: 
member capacity, relationship capacity and organizational capacity.  They further divide 
these areas into the following key categories:  
• Member Capacity:  
• core skills 
• attitudes  
• motivations  
• access 
• Relationship Capacity: 
• good internal relationships  
• positive external relationships 
• Organizational Capacity: 
• leaders with skills, relationships and vision to transform individual 
interests into a dynamic collective force 
• formalized procedure that clarify staff and member roles and 
provide clear guidelines for decision making 
• conflict resolution 
                                                 
14 Foster-Fishman, Pennie G., Berkowitz, Shelby A., Lounsbury, David W., Jacobson, Stephanie, 
Allen, Nichole A., “Building Collaborative Capacity in Community Coalitions: A Review and Integrative 
Framework,” American Journal of Community Psychology 29, no. 2 (2001): 241–261, 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/ep/research/cu2/data/bib_foster-fishman-et-al_building-collaborative.pdf (accessed 
November 5, 2011). 
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• a well developed internal communication system that promotes 
information sharing and problem discussion and resolution on a 
frequent basis 
• human and financial resources  
• a continuous learning organization to consistently seek and 
respond to feedback  
Building and strengthening collaborative capacity in homeland security 
organizations may reduce organizational friction and help these organizations improve 
their effectiveness and efficiency.  Factors related to increased collaborative capacity 
include shared values, enhanced trust, organizational culture, effective leadership and the 
building/sharing of knowledge.  Each of these factors is discussed below.   
Stephen Denning espouses that collaboration success is dependent on the 
establishment of shared values.15 He also notes that often the failure to collaborate is 
caused by management practices and reward incentives that are geared toward traditional 
work units and individual responsibility and accountability.  Collaboration failure may be 
caused by lack of substance behind the stated goal of collaboration.  Denning promotes 
the concept of use of stories to promote a team’s catalyst toward shared narratives and 
values. 
Eugene Bardach makes a case similar to Denning’s proposition, but with the 
paradigm reversed: collaborative processes may actually create new values by “staking 
out common ground that had hitherto not been realized.”16 Bardach’s work is a 
commonly referenced source of information regarding building collaboration. 
Continuing the examination of existing literature on collaborative capacity leads 
us to the importance of trust.  Conflict management skills can enhance trust within 
relationships and have positive influences on building organizational collaborative 
                                                 
15 Denning, Stephen, The Leaders Guide to Storytelling (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011), 158. 
16 Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial 
Craftsmanship. Google Books, 1998, 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CtGgXt3Ci2sC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=eugene+bardach+A
ND+collaborative+capacity&ots=hYPhOn7XUY&sig=GPRF8Oa9O7xZS7QdvCZE3FmH5Vk#v=onepage
&q=eugene%20bardach%20AND%20collaborative%20capacity&f=false (accessed July 2, 2011). 
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capacity.  Segal and Smith17 state that “conflict triggers strong emotions and can lead to 
hurt feelings, disappointment and discomfort.  When handled in an unhealthy manner, it 
can cause irreparable rifts, resentments and break-ups.  But when conflict is resolved in a 
healthy way, it increases our understanding of one another, builds trust, and strengthens 
our relationship bonds.” Segal and Smith list conflict resolution as the fifth and most 
critical of the key skills of emotional intelligence.  Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas cite trust 
as a success factor and mistrust as a barrier in their list of the most frequently cited 
barriers and facilitating factors for collaboration.18   
Organizational culture is a factor that contributes to the ability to build 
collaborative capacity.  Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas note that a culture of collaboration 
is a driving force for building collaborative capacity in homeland security.  Nahmad19 
notes that Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas discuss the assumption that cultures within 
organizations can oppose collaboration and that an organization must see collaboration as 
a feasible and even desirable route for formulating problem domains and solving 
problems.   
B. ICC MODEL OF SUCCESS FACTORS AND BARRIERS 
In the summer of 2002, Gail Thomas, Susan Hocevar and Erik Jansen20 began an 
Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity Research Project at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California. They define ICC as “the ability of organizations to enter 
into, develop and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.”  
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen’s model of ICC includes organizational domains that 
                                                 
17 Segal, Jeanne & Smith, Melinda, Conflict Resolution Skills, Helpguide.org, November 2010, 
http://www.helpguide.org/mental/eq8_conflict_resolution.htm (accessed August 15, 2011). 
18 Hocevar, Susan, Jansen, Eric & Thomas, Gail Fann, Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland 
Security, November 1, 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA431358 (accessed August 15, 2011).  
19 Nahmad, Abdo, The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY and EMS in New York City: A 
Focus on the First Line Officer, March 2010, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27182 (accessed August 
15, 2011).  
20 Jansen, Eric, Hocevar, Susan Page, Rendon, Rene G, & Thomas, Gail Fann, Interorganizational 
Collaborative Capacity: Development of a Database to Refine Instrumentation and Explore Patterns, 
November 24, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494264&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed August 22, 2011). 
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contain both driving forces and restraining forces for collaboration—Purpose, Structure, 
Lateral Mechanisms, Incentives and People Practices.21  Figure 1 illustrates success 
factors for ICC that are associated with the five domains: felt need to collaborate, 
common goal, willingness to address other agencies’ interests or cross-agency goals 
versus local organizational goals, formalized structure for coordination, formalized 
processes, sufficient authority of participants, role clarity, dedicated assets for 
collaboration, social capital, effective communication and information exchange, 
technical interoperability, combined training events, collaboration as a prerequisite for 
funding or resources, respect for other parties’ interests, expertise, roles, perspectives and 
perspective/commitment. The model also includes restraining forces of collaboration: 
divergent goals, focus on regional or local agency concerns, lack of goal clarity, not 
adaptable to interests of other organizations, impeding rules or policies, inadequate 
authority of participants, inadequate resources, lack of accountability, lack of formal roles 
or procedures for collaborating, lack of familiarity with other organizations, inadequate 
communication and information sharing, competition for resources, territoriality, 
organization level distrust and lack of mutual respect, lack of competency and 
arrogance/hostility/animosity.  
                                                 
21 Hocevar, Susan, Thomas, Gail Fann & Jansen, Eric, Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness, 2006, 
https://www.chds.us/?file&mode=dl&f=resources/uapi/summit10/Track2/Hocevar-Interorganizational-
Collaborative-Capacity-02-031510-01.pdf (accessed August 21, 2011). 
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Organizational Domains & Factors
 Structure
 Purpose & Strategy
 Lateral Processes
 People
 Incentives & 
Reward Systems
 Collaborative Learning









 Individual Collaborative   
Capacities
 Need to Collaborate
 Strategic Action for 
Collaboration
 Resource Investments








Figure 1.   Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity: Domains & Factors22  
According to Hocevar (2010), all of the success factors significantly correlated 
with ratings of collaboration success but the most accurate predictors to ICC success are: 
felt need to collaborate, social capital, support for individual collaborative capacities 
strategic action for collaboration, information sharing and individual collaborative 
capacity.  The study addresses the primary action research questions of how some 
agencies are able to develop successful collaborative relationships while others struggle 
and what factors contribute to or inhibit successful collaborations among organizations?  
The survey results are intended to be utilized as an information tool for leaders and 
change agents to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their organization’s collaborative 
capacity factors for their individual and collective organizations, in the context of 
collaborative capacity being an interconnected system in a shared problem space.  The 
recognition of specific strengths and weaknesses in collaborative capacity provides 
leaders and change agents with opportunities to design intervention strategies for the 
                                                 
22 Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen, 2010. 
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enhancement of a dynamic system’s capacity to collaborate.  Inherent to this 
methodology is recognition that the capacity for building interorganizational 
collaboration happens as a result of planning and strategic actions that develop the 
collaborative capacity environment using a systems approach.  
C. LEADERSHIP’S ROLE IN BUILDING ICC 
Building common ground and improving trust among organizational players 
requires effective leadership.  Leaders set the stage for these organizational dynamics to 
be able to flourish.  An important component of leadership is instilling common values in 
an organization.  The dynamics of conflict management, building trust, building 
knowledge capital, providing leadership and building shared values are all woven into the 
tapestry of an organization’s potential to build collaborative capacity.   
Leadership studies abound, yet we still have much to learn in this area; 
researchers still debate whether leadership is a science or an art.  A new leadership model 
has recently been introduced into homeland security termed meta-leadership—“meta-
leaders reach across organizations and sectors to build cross-cutting strategies to protect 
the safety of their families, businesses and communities.  They exchange information, 
share resources and coordinate systems and personnel.  They use their influence and 
connections to guide a cooperative course of action.”23  The five dimensions of the meta-
leader24 are described as: 
• the person of the leader and his/her awareness or problem assessment 
• the problem, change or crisis that compels response 
• leading one’s entity and/or operating in one’s designated purview of 
authority 
• leading up to bosses or those to whom one is accountable 
• leading cross-system connectivity  
                                                 
23 CDC Foundation, Meta-Leader Summit for Preparedness, 2010, 
http://www.metaleadershipsummit.org/ (accessed October 29, 2010).  
24 Marcus, Leonard J., Isaac Ashkenazi, Barry Dorn, and Joseph Henderson, “The 5 Dimensions of 
Meta-Leadership,” in National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, Harvard School of Public Health and 
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, November 2007, http://meta-
leadershipsummit.org/Files/meta/2011/FiveDimensionsofMeta-LeadershipComprehensiveBrief.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2010). 
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Boal and Schultz25 acknowledge that organizations are increasingly being 
described as complex adaptive systems (CAS) that have the view that the behavior and 
structure of an organization emerges out of the interaction of a collection of 
organizational agents with seemingly little role for strategic leadership since the system 
self organizes.  However, they go on to argue that strategic leaders play a crucial role in 
moving organizations to an environment of organizational learning and adaption by 
storytelling and dialogue, which shape the interactions and construct the shared meanings 
that provide the rationale by which the past, the present and the future of the organization 
come together.   
Leaders enhance opportunities for building collaborative capacity in organizations 
by setting conditions for building and sharing knowledge, which enhances trust and 
performance among stakeholders.  Lee, Gillespie, Mann and Wearing26 of Australia 
examine the relationship between the leader as the knowledge builder, trust in the leader 
and in the team, knowledge sharing and team performance.  Their findings indicate that 
“as the team builds respect for each other’s knowledge and expertise, the willingness to 
rely on each other is reinforced.”  The knowledge-builder role is also about tapping into 
tacit knowledge.  This involves the leader setting an example by conveying to the team 
his/her candid insights and experiences, concerns about the project, personal beliefs and 
lessons learned, as well as facilitating opportunities for the team to share.  Their findings 
are also significant in that it suggests that team knowledge sharing was a significant 
predictor of team performance.  “When team members share knowledge, their team was 
better able to meet project goals, achieve quality, meet customer’s expectations and 
achieve efficiency.”27  
                                                 
25 Boal, Kimberly B. and Schultz, Patrick L., “Storytelling, Time, and Evolution: The Role of 
Strategic Leadership in Complex Adaptive Systems,” Leadership Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007): 411–418, 
http://kimboal.ba.ttu.edu/Selected%20writings/story%20telling.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011). 
26 Lee, Pauline, Gillespie, Nichole, Mann, Leon, & Wearing Alexandar, Leadership and Trust: Their 
Effect on Knowledge Sharing and Team Performance, 473, June 28, 2010, 
http://mlq.sagepub.com/content/41/4/473.abstract (accessed December 2, 2010).     
27 Lee, Gillespie, Mann, Wearing, Leadership and Trust, p. 485. 
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D. ICC FRICTIONS AND CREATIVE TENSIONS   
The dynamic of organizational friction is not a new concept.  General Carl von 
Clausewitz, the renowned nineteenth century Prussian soldier and military theorist, 
introduced the concept of friction as “a hindrance to the execution of strategy” in his 
1832 seminal treatise Vom Kriege.  Clausewitz used friction to describe the “myriad of 
small, but collectively numerous things that happen that cannot be foreseen or planned 
for, and which cause leaders to spend time on unforeseen decision making.”28 Clausewitz 
noted that no organizational unit can be thought of as a single or solitary piece when he 
said, “let us reflect that no one part of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of 
individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions” (Graham, 1873, p. 
7).  Clausewitz believed that friction in war was the result of three primary factors: the 
danger of war, war's demanding physical efforts, and the presence of unclear 
information.29  Similar factors—danger, demanding efforts and unclear information—
exist in America’s homeland security environment and specifically in Florida’s CDM 
Enterprise. 
Clausewitz also introduced the term “the fog of war” to discuss the confusion that 
can reign on the battlefield as a result of unclear information.  America may be 
experiencing “the fog of homeland security” while seeking proper balance between 
security against varied threats and preservation of democratic freedoms. As Clausewitz 
observed in Chapter VII of On War, the fog of war causes even simple tasks to become 
difficult, due to friction.  Likewise, tasks that may appear simple in homeland security are 
made difficult by friction and the fog of homeland security.  As Clausewitz notes in On 
War, fog is not a certain point of concern but “is everywhere at once.”30 In today’s 
homeland security efforts, fog surrounds the homeland security team with a mist of 
uncertainty from whence the next threat will come and what will initiate the next event.     
                                                 
28 Graham, J. J., On War, 1873, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm (accessed 
October 24, 2010). 
29 United States Air Force, Clausewitz Condensed: Friction of War, 2010, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/clauswtz/clwt000b.htm (accessed October 25, 2010). 
30 Graham, On War, 8. 
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Clausewitz noted that the primary adverse effect caused by friction is in the realm 
of time management—that friction has a detrimental effect on the time that things take, in 
written plans, to actually implement in practice due to unexpected distractions.  The most 
relevant issue that Clausewitz raises for the purpose of this research is that managing 
constraints is an important component of organizational effectiveness.  Hence, the 
reduction of organizational friction enhances the capability of organizational 
effectiveness and throughput.    
Past research illustrates the relationships between organizational friction and 
creative tension. Dr. Peter Senge describes creative tension in his book titled The Fifth 
Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization31 as the difference gap 
between where you currently are as an individual or an organization and where you want 
to be.  Senge discusses how creative tension “comes from seeing clearly where we want 
to be, our vision, and telling the truth about where we are, our current reality.”  Note the 
distinct difference between organizational friction that Clautzwitz described as forces that 
hinder the execution of strategy—restraining factors as described by Lewin—and Senge’s 
creative tension, which is a healthy seeking of closing the gap between a vision of where 
you want to be and the reality of where you currently are.  Organizational friction is 
created by forces often beyond our control that cause leaders to spend additional time in 
decision making, while creative tension is a state of seeking new knowledge in order to 
enhance our knowledge, actions and circumstances.  The terms are related in that both 
have a built-in likelihood for conflict, but are distinctly different in how the conflict is 
typically resolved by individuals and organizations. Organizational friction can cause 
delays and frustrations, while creative tension can lead to exciting new discoveries and 
opportunities.     
Human factors that may create friction include mental models, personalities, 
interpersonal communications and human emotions.  Mental models help explain why 
humans react differently; mental models provide the lenses through which people see 
their world and “they incorporate biases, values, learning, experiences and beliefs about 
                                                 
31 Senge, P. M., The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, Infed., 
http://www.infed.org/thinkers/senge.htm (accessed September 26, 2010). 
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how the world works.”32  The term mental model was first introduced by Forrester in 
1961 and is cited by Peter Senge in his discussions of learning organizations. Senge 
defined mental models as “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even 
pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action. 
Very often, we are not consciously aware of our mental models or the effects they have 
on our behavior.”33   
Schein discusses mental models—what he describes as cognitive redefinition34 
and notes that it can have impacts such as: 
• semantic redefinition where we learn that words can mean something 
different than what we had assumed 
• cognitive broadening where we learn that a given concept can be more 
broadly interpreted than what we had assumed  
• new standards of judgment or evaluation where we learn that the anchors 
we  used for adjustments and comparison are not absolute and that if we 
use a different anchor, our scale of judgment shifts   
Schein uses the term teamwork as an example to describe his meaning and this 
example is pertinent to our examination of the building of ICC.  In the United States, our 
focus on the individual causes a cultural assumption that society revolves around the 
individual and creates a cognitive framework that often rewards individualism, and 
winning over individuals makes collaborative behavior appear weak.  We can make 
collaborative efforts appear strong by redefining teamwork as the coordination of 
individual activities for pragmatic ends that can encourage individuals to take actions 
towards creating, leading and participating in teams.  Note that one of the success factors 
of the ICC project is collaboration as a prerequisite for funding or resources. Schein 
advocates that this process of cognitive redefinition is fundamental to any change if one 
wants it to last.  Note the similarity of Schein’s cognitive redefinition to Boal and 
                                                 
32 Chermack, Thomas J., “Mental Models in Decision Making and Implications for Human Resource 
Development,” in Advances in Human Resource Development 2003 5:408, 410, 2003, 
http://adh.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/5/4/408.full.pdf+html (accessed October 28, 2010). 
33 Chermack, “Mental Models,” 410. 
34 Schein, Edgar H., Cognitive Redefinition. Kurt Lewin’s Change Theory in the Field and In the 
Classroom: Notes Toward a Model of Managed Learning, n.d., 
http://www.solonline.org/res/wp/10006.html (accessed November 11, 2011).  
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Schultz’s argument that strategic leaders provide the shared mental constructs through 
dialogue and storytelling that provide meaning to organizations and link the past, present 
and future. 
Senge espouses that generative organizational learning consists of five core 
disciplines: personal mastery, mental models, team learning, shared vision and systems 
thinking.  Personal mastery consists of individual lifelong learning as a continual process 
with the guiding principle that organizations learn only through individuals who learn.  
This is significant when viewed in the context that Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints 
(TOC), which I will discuss later in the literature review, and which espouses that a chain 
is only as strong as its weakest link.  Senge’s work provides emphasis that individual 
links in the system’s chain must seek personal mastery as a continual process of lifelong 
learning that will continually harness the energy and creativeness of the individual 
components of a system.  Personal mastery, as espoused by Senge, involves people with a 
high degree of personal mastery who are acutely aware of their own ignorance, their 
incompetence and their growth areas.   
Senge’s second core discipline of mental models relates to how we view deeply 
ingrained assumptions, beliefs, generalizations and mental images that influence how we 
understand the world and how we take action.  Senge noted that entrenched mental 
models thwart changes that could come from systems thinking—his fifth discipline—and 
that moving the organization in the right direction entails working to transcend the sort of 
internal politics and game playing that dominate traditional organizations.  Senge also 
noted that developing new mental models to foster organizational learning means 
fostering more openness and involves seeking to distribute business responsibility far 
more widely, while also retaining coordination and control.   
Senge’s third core discipline builds upon personal mastery and building a shared 
vision to create team learning.  Team learning is developing a process of aligning and 
developing the capacities of a team to create the results its members truly desire.  Senge 
advocates that the realization of team learning starts with dialogue—the capacity of team 
members to suspend assumptions and enter into a genuine thinking, together with the 
realization that a collective free-flowing exchange of information allows the group to 
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discover insights that are unattainable individually, and to recognize interactive patterns 
that undermine team learning.  Note that collaboration with others is critical in this core 
discipline. 
Senge’s fourth core discipline of building a shared vision relates to building 
shared vision that is focused on the long-term future.  Senge notes that when there is a 
shared vision, people excel and learn, not because they have to, but because they want to.  
His concept of creative tension is centric to this core discipline.  Building a shared vision 
is critical to the success of ICC.    
Senge’s fifth discipline of systems thinking is the conceptual cornerstone of his 
approach to organizational learning.  Systems thinking, as defined by Senge, is generally 
oriented towards the long term view.  He views delays in the system and feedback loops 
as vital to the long-term view, while possibly inconsequential in the short term.  The ICC 
model is designed to view the building of ICC as a system operating in a shared 
interorganizational problem space.  Figure 2, from the ICC Model, illustrates this 
conceptual approach to viewing the building of ICC as a systems issue. 
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Figure 2.   Organizations in a Common Problem Space35 
Readers may note that many of the above mentioned friction points in Senge’s 
creative tensions share a nexus with ICC success and barrier factors.  As examples, the 
ICC success factor of a felt need to collaborate has linkage to Senge’s goals and 
priorities, and the ICC barrier factor of lack of familiarity with other organizations has 
linkage to Senge’s discussion of consortiums of different organizational cultures.  What 
follows are tables from my own analysis that illustrate possible relationships between the 
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen ICC domains with their respective success and barrier 
factors to Senge’s five core disciplines for organizational learning.   
Senge’s Core Disciplines for Organizational Learning 
1. Personal mastery 
2. Mental models 
                                                 
35 From Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen 2010. 
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3. Team learning 
4. Building shared vision 
5. Systems thinking 
Table 1.   ICC Success Factors Correlation With Senge’s Five Core Disciples For 
Organizational Learning 
  Domains Success Factors Senge’s 
Core 
Disciplines 
Purpose  Felt Need to Collaborate 2, 4, 5 
 Common Goal 2, 4 
 Willingness to Address Other Agencies 
Interests or Cross-Agency Goals versus 
Local Organizational Goals 
2, 4, 5 
Structure Formalized Structure for Coordination 2, 5 
 Formalized Processes 2, 5 
 Sufficient Authority of Participants 2, 5 
 Role Clarity 2, 3, 5 
 Dedicated Assets for Collaboration 5 
Lateral Mechanisms Social Capital 1, 4 
 Effective Communication and 
Information Exchange 
1, 2, 5 
 Technical Interoperability 1, 5 
 Combined Training Events 2, 3, 4 
Incentives Collaboration as a Prerequisite for 
Funding or Resources 
2, 5 
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  Domains Success Factors Senge’s 
Core 
Disciplines 
People Practices Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, 
Expertise, Roles, Perspectives 
2, 4 
 Perseverance/Commitment 1, 2 
Table 2.   ICC Success Factors Correlation With Senge’s Five Core Disciples For 
Organizational Learning 
Domains Barrier Factors Senge’s 
Core 
Disciplines 
Purpose  Divergent Goals 2, 4 
 Focus on Regional or Local Agency 
Concerns 
2, 4, 5 
 Lack of Goal Clarity 2, 5 
 Not Adaptable to Interests of Other 
Organization 
2, 5 
Structure Impeding Rules or Policies 2, 5 
 Inadequate Authority of Participants 2, 5 
 Inadequate Resources 2, 5 
 Lack of Accountability 1, 2, 5 
 Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for 
Collaborating 
2, 3, 5 
Lateral Mechanisms Lack of Familiarity with Other 
Organizations 
1, 3, 4 
 Inadequate Communication and 
Information Sharing 
1, 2, 3, 5 
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Domains Barrier Factors Senge’s 
Core 
Disciplines 
Incentives Competition for Resources 2, 5 
 Territoriality 2, 4, 5 
 Organization-Level Distrust and Lack of 
Mutual Respect 
2, 3, 4 
People Practices Lack of Competency 1, 2 
 Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity 1, 2 
To conclude our discussion of Senge’s work, we review how Senge viewed the 
critical relationship between building a shared vision and systems thinking.  Senge 
believed that the discipline of building shared vision lacks foundation if practiced without 
systems thinking.  He articulated that vision paints a picture of what we want to create 
and system’s thinking reveals how we have created what we already have.  The ICC 
Model may assist in developing a collaborative vision, as well as facilitating systems 
thinking, to analyze how collaborative capacity is created within an interorganizational 
problem space.  
E. ICC AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Goldratt espoused his Theory of Constraints (TOC) as an overall philosophy 
designed to effectively manage organizational change. This practice uses Problem 
Solving and Management Decision Making Tools called the Thinking Processes to 
logically and systematically answer the three questions of what to change, what to change 
to and how to cause the change.36  Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints has applicability to 
the collaboration process in that collaboration may be viewed in an organization seeking 
to build collaborative capacity as a throughput; Goldratt’s theory of constraints espouses 
the basic theorem that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link and that sources of 
                                                 
36 Dettmer, H. William, Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints: A Systems Approach to Continuous 
Improvement, 1997, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/214520960?accountid=12702 
(accessed July 2, 2011).   
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friction must be identified and minimized to reach maximum throughput.  If we accept 
this premise as true, then those seeking to build collaborative capacity may find it useful 
to identify sources of friction for building collaborative capacity and focus targeted 
educational efforts and change management toward those organizational units or links in 
a system that are perceived as requiring strengthening in collaborative capacity.   
TOC has relevance to the building of interorganizational collaborative capacity 
based on basic principles in the TOC theory espoused by Goldratt.  The prescriptive 
component of the theory37 assists managers and change agents to answer three questions 
relating to systems and their constraints: where is the constraint, what should we do with 
the constraint and how do we implement the change?   Several principles outlined in 
Goldratt’s TOC support finding answers to these three questions:  
• systems thinking is preferable to analytical thinking in managing change 
and solving problems 
• ongoing improvement is imperative as the system’s environment changes 
over time 
• each system has a weakest link that inhibits the success of the entire 
system 
• strengthening any link in a system’s chain other than the weakest link does 
nothing to strengthen the entire system 
• most of the undesirable effects in a system are a result of a few core 
problems 
• understand a system before changing it 
• solving the few core problems is a long-term solution while focusing on 
individual undesirable effects and ignoring the core problems is a short-
term solution 
• core problems are manifested through a number of undesirable effects 
linked through a network of cause and effect 
• core problems are usually perpetuated by hidden or underlying conflict 
• system problems are either physical or policy, with policy constraints 
usually being more difficult to identify and eliminate 
• ideas alone are not solutions without implementation  
                                                 
37 Broughton, Robert, Theory of Constraints. Business Excellence, 2011, 
http://www.bexcellence.org/Theory-of-Constraints.html (accessed November 9, 2011). 
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• inertia is the worst enemy of ongoing improvement 
Broughton discusses five focusing steps for implementing Goldratt’s TOC for an 
organization:  
• identify the constraint that is the weakest link in a system 
• decide how to exploit the constraint without committing to expensive 
changes or upgrades 
• subordinate everything else to the elimination of the constraint 
• elevate the constraint if steps 1 through 3 have not eliminated the 
constraint  
• return to step 1 once the constraint is broken      
Leaders and change agents interested in the building of collaborative capacity 
may find value in using the Goldratt TOC principles to provide a framework in order to 
eliminate identified ICC constraints.  By leveraging Goldratt’s TOC principles, change 
leaders can focus on identified barrier factors to identify core problems contributing to 
specific areas of concern.  Is the core issue a physical problem, such as inadequate 
hardware and software systems, or is the problem a policy issue such as statutes or 
interagency procedures?  Change agents can identify potential weakest links in the chain, 
such as in what part of the information-sharing process does the breakdown occur most 
frequently?  Does the breakdown of information sharing occur between specific agencies 
in the collaborative environment?  Are there contributing core problems such as 
inadequate social capital between agencies that cause information breakdowns?  Can 
social capital be increased by increasing the interaction between agencies?  Does the 
information-sharing breakdown occur more frequently at specific levels? Are there 
policies in place that preclude sharing of certain types of information?  These are all 
examples of questions that may be asked by leaders and change agents to enhance 
communication and information sharing in the ICC strategic environment.   
Political Scientist Eugene Bardach advocates the use of Smart Practices—it is 
only sensible to see what kinds of solutions have been tried in other jurisdictions, 
agencies or locales. You want to look for those that appear to have worked pretty well, 
try to understand exactly how and why they may have worked, and evaluate their 
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applicability to your own situation.38 Bardach calls this search smart practices, instead of 
the more commonly used term best practices, because most practices are not ranked 
utilizing analytical research methods to adequately quantify them as the “best” method, 
but can be subjectively deemed to be a “smart” practice.   Bardach states that a practice is 
a tangible and visible behavior. A practice may be a description of what one does or it 
may be an expression of some underlying idea—an idea about how some actions entailed 
by the practice work to solve a problem or achieve a goal.   
Organizations may not always be able to control external threats but can take 
steps to reduce organizational friction created by internal forces. This review considers 
existing literature that may assist in determining how to reduce homeland security 
organizational friction and the fog of homeland security.  Just as friction wear can be 
reduced by the proper lubricant, organizational friction can be reduced by the lubricant of 
organizational development including training and education.  Organizational 
development’s primary goal is to change the attitudes, values and structures of 
organizations so that they can meet new demands.39  
Today’s understanding of organizational development is due to past efforts of 
leaders in the field such as Dr. Peter Senge, Dr. Peter Drucker, Dr. Chris Argyris, Dr. 
Kurt Lewin and Dr. Rensis Likert.  This research project applies organizational 
development to the field of homeland security and provides homeland security 
professionals with tools to utilize in their own organizations.  Homeland security 
organizations share similar characteristics as other large corporations that have benefited 
from past organizational development efforts. Organizational development adheres to a 
systems view of organizational change efforts as opposed to an individualist view.   
Among the most influential scholars associated with organizational development 
are Kurt Lewin and Edgar Schein.  Lewin espoused that change in humans is a three-
                                                 
38 Bardach, Eugene, “Smart (Best) Practices Research: Understanding and Making Use of What Look 
Like Good Ideas from Somewhere Else,” in A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to 
More Effective Problem Solving, 3rd ed., (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009). 
39 Organization Development, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2010, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/432078/organization-development (accessed October 26, 
2011).  
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stage process—unfreezing, changing and refreezing.  The unfreezing phase is 
accomplished by the utilization of what he termed force field analysis: identifying what 
driving forces and restraining forces create equilibrium of the status quo.  In Lewin’s 
model, change is accomplished by either increasing the driving forces for change or 
decreasing the restraining forces for change. Edgar Schein, former Professor Emeritus of 
Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management and himself a leading figure in the 
field of change management, noted that there is little question that the intellectual father 
of contemporary theories of applied behavioral science, action research and planned 
change is Kurt Lewin. His seminal work on leadership style and the experiments on 
planned change that took place in World War II, in an effort to change consumer 
behavior, launched a whole generation of research in group dynamics and the 
implementation of change programs.40  
Lewin’s work led others that followed him in the field of organizational 
development to conclude that the notion of resistance to change and that its use as a 
systems concept affecting managers and employees equally is credited to Lewin.41 For 
Lewin, group behavior was the result of the complex system or field of forces that 
surrounded it.  Change only occurs when the field changes and the result is dependent on 
which forces increase and which forces diminish, In seeking to explain Lewin’s results, 
French and Zander, in 1949, drew attention to the dynamic concept of force, field of 
forces and conflict of forces and maintained that allowing the workers to participate in 
the design of the system instilled confidence, while strengthening the forces that tended 
to increase confidence in themselves, and diminishing the forces that tended to weaken it. 
This type participative approach is a central tenet in the process of building 
ICC—inclusion of the stakeholders in the process of designing the restructured 
framework for building ICC strengthens the participant’s confidence in the collaborative 
environment and exponentially increases the likelihood for lasting change.  This process 
                                                 
40 Burnes, Bernard, Kurt Lewin, “Harwood Studies: The Foundations of OD.” The Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science 43, no. 2, June 2007, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/236352406/fulltextPDF/130A992A7191BF2BD1/18?
accountid=12702 (accessed July 19, 2011). 
41 Burnes and Lewin, “Harwood Studies.” 
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serves as an immediate catalyst for increasing confidence by strengthening certain forces 
while tending to diminish forces that served to lower confidence.  This process may be 
more time consuming and require greater collective effort, but it helps to establish a long-
term strategy.  A more expedite top-down driven approach may be faster, but will likely 
not establish a long-term change effort.   
The ICC research project that established success and barrier factors for building 
interorganizational collaborative capacity appears to have drawn upon Lewin’s work by 
viewing ICC as a complex system of driving and restraining forces that either strengthen 
or hinder the building of ICC between agencies.  A force field analysis methodology 
appears to have been utilized to develop building ICC driving and restraining forces.  
Much of Lewin’s work was conducted over 70 years ago, but still provides a practical 
method for analyzing a complex system’s forces that either enable or hinder the success 
of the overall system.      
F. CONCLUSION 
To conclude our literature review, let us now return to the research questions for 
this project and examine how the literature review will support the answers for this study.  
We have discussed the importance of building ICC within the homeland security 
environment and discovered many of the important tenets of ICC to include trust, shared 
values and a common vision.  We have discovered many already existing smart practices 
for building collaborative capacity, such as the Naval Postgraduate School 
Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity Research Project, which provides proposed 
success and barrier factors for the building of ICC—the use of already developed success 
and barrier factors for interorganizational collaborative capacity developed by Hocevar, 
Thomas and Jansen can be used as a guide for the analysis of past emergency events to 
assess the presence of these factors and develop a storyline for the evolution of the 
building of collaborative capacity within an interagency collaborative effort.  We’ve 
discussed that leadership plays an important role in the building of ICC in a complex 
adaptive system.  Leadership, building shared values, knowledge building and sharing, 
and building trust all play an integral role in the building of collaborative capacity within 
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organizations. This storyline can then be used as a potential model for how to build 
collaborative capacity over a period of development in order to provide smart practices 
for future collaborative efforts. We have discussed organizational friction—what it is and 
what the potential impacts are for leaders.  Organizational friction and creative tension 
have a shared nexus in organizational learning that can serve to enhance collaborative 
capacity if mental models are constructed to develop a sense of organizational learning as 
a process of continuous discovery.  Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints can be leveraged as 
a means to understand constraining ICC factors.  We have discussed organizational 
learning—Senge’s five disciplines for generative knowledge and how these disciplines 
may be related to ICC domains.  We discussed smart practices—what they mean and how 
they can be used to foster new discoveries using already existing practices.  Smart 
practices that can be leveraged to build collaborative capacity include interorganizational 
collaborative capacity, organizational development methods and Force Field Analysis.  
We examined how past research efforts in collaboration relate to the ICC Research 
Project, ICC domains for building ICC, and potentially influence these domains. 
There is a shared nexus of systems thinking between Goldratt’s TOC, Senge’s 
Organizational Learning and Lewin’s FFA.  All of these theories provide leaders and 
change leaders with tools to utilize as smart practices for change management.  The ICC 
Collaborative Model takes a similar approach to provide a smart practice for conducting 




Figure 3.   Theory of Constraints, Organizational Learning, Force Field Analysis and 




This thesis project uses a combination of a qualitative, formative program 
evaluation with research into specific case studies of Florida’s Comprehensive Disaster 
Management (CDM) Enterprise. The study is limited in scope to the past 20 years.  The 
initial starting point for the study is the Hurricane Andrew response in 1992, since this 
period marks a change in Florida’s strategic paradigm concerning CDM.  The study 
continues through the present period and focuses on the Florida State Emergency 
Response Team’s (SERT) interagency efforts.  The intent is to provide a consistent 
historical narrative of past efforts while searching for collaborative smart practices that 
may be leveraged to continue strengthening the Florida CDM enterprise.   
A. DATA COLLECTION 
Data used for this research includes information extracted from unclassified after-
action reports from operations and training exercises, published congressional 
testimonies, public documents such as legislative statutes and plans and already-
published interviews with public and private officials.  Specifically, the study analyzes 
the following reports using an analytical method: 
• The Governor’s Disaster and Planning Response Review Committee Final 
Report (The Lewis Report) dated January 15, 1993 
• Through the Flames…An Assessment of Florida’s Wildfires of 1998: The 
Report of the Governor’s Wildfire Response and Mitigation Review 
Committee dated December 31, 1998 
• Florida Department of Military Affairs Florida National Guard Summer 
Storms 2004 After-Action Report August-October dated January 19, 2005 
B. METHOD FRAMEWORK 
The following is an outline of the method used to select and analyze the reports 
used in this thesis: 
• Identify data sources to be examined.  Consider start and end points, time 
between each event, and the breadth and objectivity of data and sources.  
Validate data sources by cross-referencing against other available sources  
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• Identify the conceptual model to be used for Force Field Analysis, 
including applicability, thoroughness of model, and use of systems 
thinking. 
• Research ICC Model domains, success factors and barrier factors and 
develop an understanding of the meaning and significance of each success 
and barrier factor as well as relationships between factors 
• Establish background and context for each data source by researching 
background for each event and provide a narrative for each event to 
establish context. 
• Conduct qualitative FFA on each data source to identify ICC success and 
failure factors utilizing the ICC Model by examining each data source 
(After-Action Review/Lessons Learned Report) using each individual ICC 
success factor as a frame of reference.  Look for specific and implied 
references. 
• Develop a narrative for each ICC success and barrier factor including 
findings for each ICC success and barrier factor from each data source.  
Also consider additional findings that are not contained within success and 
barrier factors. 
• Identify patterns of findings including relationships between success and 
barrier factors in individual and multiple data sources. 
• Identify conclusions including the impact of timeline, environment on 
factors and relationships between factors.  Also consider factors in context 
of known theories and concepts. 
• Develop recommendations considering, future vision, systems thinking 




V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter examines three lessons learned in after-action reports from the 
Florida emergency management experiences of the past 20 years—each occurring 
approximately six years after the preceding examined event.  The reports are examined in 
the chronological order that they occurred: Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Wildfires in 1998 
and the aptly named Summer of Storms in 2004.  The reports are examined using the 
Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC) success 
and barrier factors as a force field analysis methodology for the identification of driving 
and restraining factors to the building of ICC within Florida’s CDM Enterprise.  Both the 
specified and implied narrative of each report is systematically assessed for identifying 
each success factor and each barrier factor.      
A background for each event is provided and then each of the five ICC domains 
are examined for success and barrier factors.  Two tables are provided for each event 
showing the success and barrier factors that were identified as present.  A narrative of 
contributing factors that were identified, other than the ICC domains, is provided.  A 
conclusion for each event is then provided for discussing the event in the context of ICC.    
A. HURRICANE ANDREW 1992 
1. Background 
Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Florida on August 24, 1992.  In 1992, 
Hurricane Andrew was the third most powerful storm to hit the United States in its 
recorded history, exceeded only by Camille in 1969 and the Labor Day Storm that struck 
the Florida Keys in 1935.  Hurricane Andrew was the most costly natural disaster in 
America’s history at the time, with estimated damage exceeding $20 billion dollars.   
The Florida Governor at the time, the late Lawton Chiles, issued orders to 
establish The Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee to record lessons 
learned from the state level response and recovery efforts.  This committee received oral 
testimony from over 45 five individuals and written recommendations from over 100 
agencies, organizations and people either impacted or involved in the Hurricane Andrew 
 38 
response during an eight-day series of meetings conducted between October 1992 and 
January 1993.  The committee was assisted in its development of the report by a panel of 
25 technical advisory experts.     
The committee recognized that their task was to be forward looking in their 
examination of the past and ongoing event.  The report makes this clear with the 
following introductory statement: “to ensure Florida takes advantage of the lessons that 
can be learned from Hurricane Andrew to improve emergency preparedness and recovery 
programs, Governor Chiles issued Executive Order 92-291 to create the Disaster 
Planning and Response Review Committee on September 11, 1992.” The commission 
subsequently compiled a report42 with a total of 94 recommendations to be considered by 
the Florida Governor and Florida Legislature.  From these recommendations, the 
committee noted four major solutions that were repeatedly identified during testimonial 
collection: 
• improve communications at and among all levels of government 
• strengthen plans for evacuation, shelter and post-disaster response and 
recovery 
• enhance intergovernmental coordination 
• improve training 
A strong argument can be made that the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew was the 
initial catalyst for change in the manner that Florida officials viewed the issue of 
emergency preparedness.  In the book titled Megacommunities,43 the authors describe 
how Florida changed their approach to hurricane response as a result of lessons learned 
from the 1992 Hurricane Andrew aftermath, and how the success of this approach 
became clear during the severe 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons.  This approach is 
described as deliberate involvement of a variety of organizations—public sector, 
corporate, non-governmental and faith-based in its emergency planning and activities.  
                                                 
42 Lewis, Phillip D., The Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee’s Final 
Report on Hurricane Andrew, January 15, 1993, 
http://www.floridadisaster.org/documents/Lewis%20Report%201992.pdf (accessed August 12, 2011). 
43 Gerencser, Mark, Van Lee, Reginald, Napolitano, Fernando and Kelly, Christopher, 
Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global 
Challenges Together (New York: Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Palgrave MacMillan Publishers, 2008). 
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Former Florida Governor, Jeb Bush, testified before the U.S. House Committee on 
Homeland Security October 19, 2005 and stated that “Florida learned a hard lesson about 
response and recovery after Andrew—that catastrophic storm was a wake-up call for all 
Floridians.”44  This hard lesson referred to by then Governor Bush stemmed at least 
partly from negative public perception that the federal and state governments had failed 
the South Florida populace in responding to Andrew in a timely manner; this perception 
was publicly synopsized by then Dade County, Florida Emergency Management 
Director, Kate Hale, who appeared on national television with the statement “where in 
the hell is the Calvary? They keep saying that we’re going to get supplies.  For God’s 
sake, where are they?”45  As a result of lessons learned from the aftermath of Hurricane 
Andrew, Florida moved to a new emergency response approach that stressed a proactive 
inter-disciplinary model, “specifically, it was now clear to Florida’s leaders that no 
government agency could manage this type of large-scale catastrophe on its own, so 
Florida moved to a new approach, deliberately involving a variety of organizations—
public sector, corporate, non-governmental and faith based in its emergency planning and 
activities.  This meant changing both the planning process and the relationship among 
those various groups.”46   
A major starting point for the change in Florida’s methodology for emergency 
preparedness issues can be traced to the report compiled by The Disaster Planning and 
Response Review Committee. This report is known as The Lewis Commission Report 
named after former State Senate President Philip D. Lewis, who served as the chairman 
of the commission.47 Since these recommendations from a report compiled in 1992 
marked the start of the modern era of Florida Comprehensive Disaster Management, it is 
worth reviewing the report again in the context of how it served to build collaborative 
capacity within Florida.     
                                                 
44 Himberger, Douglas, Sulek, David and Krill, Jr., Stephen J., When There is No Calvary (Disaster 
Resource Guide. Santa Ana, CA, 2007), http://www.disaster-resource.com/articles/08p_056.shtml 
(accessed May 30, 2011). 
45 Gerencser et al., Megacommunities, 25.  
46 Ibid., 27.  
47 Mittler, A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management. 
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2. Purpose Domain  
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Felt Need to Collaborate.  The aftermath of Hurricane Andrew 
created a thorough reassessment by the state of Florida for the need to collaborate across 
government and with the private sector.  Some of the report’s major recommendations 
demonstrating the recognized need to collaborate are covered below, although the list is 
not all inclusive.  The report’s Recommendation 1 stated that “the Department of 
Community Affairs should work with Florida’s counties, cities, the media and interested 
associations and organizations to develop and implement a comprehensive, multimedia 
and multilingual public information campaign on emergency preparedness issues.”  
Comments from this recommendation included entering into a dialogue with the Florida 
Association of Broadcasters and the Florida Radio-Television News Directors 
Association, as well as coordinating with public schools, to include emergency 
preparedness issues on school curricula.  Recommendation 2 discussed the Department of 
Community Affairs, county emergency operations agencies, voluntary organizations and 
the local mass media cooperatively developing procedures to use the Weather Channel, 
CNN and the mass media to broadcast emergency information to the public.  
Recommendation 3 discussed cooperation between the Florida Department of 
Transportation and the Florida Highway Patrol to lift tolls at specific locations if a severe 
traffic pattern develops as a result of emergency operations.  Recommendation 21 
discussed cooperation between the Florida Department of Transportation and the United 
States Coast Guard to develop a rule establishing procedures for when drawbridges 
should be locked down.  Recommendation 24 discussed a collaborative effort between 
interested agencies such as the Florida Department of Education, Board of Regents, local 
school boards, local community college boards and the American Red Cross to survey 
and retrofit existing state, municipal and county owned buildings to use as emergency 
evacuation shelters.  Recommendations 37–43 called for the establishment of an 
Emergency Support Function for communications to assure telecommunications support 
to all state and federal agencies for post emergency response efforts, to establish  
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collaborative procedures for emergency communications, pre-staging of communications 
equipment and sharing of existing communications equipment between governmental 
agencies.   
2.)  Strategic Action to Collaborate.  The report listed many 
strategic action plan recommendations that would enhance interorganizational 
collaborative capacity.  These initiatives primarily focused on the following areas: 
communications to include education, evacuation, shelter, post-disaster response and 
recovery operations, and availability of damage assessment data, medical care and relief, 
and coordination of volunteers, donations and supplies.  The report’s introduction 
discusses that “this plan (comprehensive emergency management plan) should be created 
in coordination with all possible agencies, organizations and associations because many 
other entities besides the Department of Community Affairs have vital roles and 
responsibilities under Florida’s emergency preparedness and recovery plans and 
programs.” 
b. Willingness to Address Other Agencies Interests or Cross-Agency 
Goals Versus 
1.)  Local Organization Goals.  The report’s extensive use of so 
many agencies and participants is indicative that the committee resolved to address 
interagency goals.  Important to this effort was the solicitation of much feedback from the 
community and private organizations as well as governmental agencies.    
c. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Divergent Goals.  Review of the Lewis Report indicates that 
primary divergent goals existed between the different geographical regions of the state.  
Even after Hurricane Andrew’s devastation, the legislators of North Florida expressed 
reservations in placing the costs for what they perceived as a South Florida threat onto 
the citizens of North and Central Florida.  This had been a point of contention in passing 
emergency management funding mechanisms prior to Hurricane Andrew and continued 
after Hurricane Andrew.  Until a storm in March of 1993 impacted North and Central 
Florida, North and Central Florida legislators continued to oppose passing of legislation 
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to provide a centralized emergency management trust fund that included shared tax 
increases for the entire state.  Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen note that “purpose can be 
driven by a commonly perceived risk or threat (felt need) or a common goal such as 
improving information sharing, coordinated training, or overall preparedness.”48  
Hurricane Andrew’s aftermath began the process of causing recognition of the potential 
for the threat of catastrophic disaster impacts and the 1993 winter storm served to place 
the perceived threat as a statewide problem.   
2.)  Focus on Local Organization over Cross-Agency Concerns.  
The Lewis Report was created prior to establishment of the Florida State Emergency 
Response Team concept and subsequently focused on changes for individual agencies, 
albeit with a focus on interagency collaborations.  The report focused on relationships 
and collaboration among individual agencies such as the Florida Department of 
Transportation and the Florida Highway Patrol or the Florida Department of Emergency 
Management and the Florida State Board of Education, but did not emphasize a network 
of interagency collaboration.  The self-stated primary target audience of the report was 
county governments, which served the purpose of emphasizing that “all emergencies are 
local” and the primary customers for state support are the impacted counties.   
3.)  Lack of Goal Clarity.  Because the report was written prior to 
the establishment of the State Emergency Response Team framework, goals were 
established for individual agencies but with minimal interorganizational team goals.  The 
argument could be made that the Lewis Commission established the concept of a state 
interorganizational team, which subsequently became the State Emergency Response 
Team; the commission was comprised of an interorganizational team of subject matter 
experts and adopted a holistic approach to the lessons learned for future implementation.  
Goals were clear for individual agencies but did not establish a centralized collective 
means to monitor individual agencies’ goal attainment.   
4.)  Not Adaptable to Interests of Other Organizations.  No specific 
examples were found.  Examples were found that indicated the reverse to be more 
accurate—the proposals were adaptable to other interests of other organizations.  One 
                                                 
48 Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen, Building Collaborative Capacity, 255–274.  
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example was a discussion on whether the proposals should be nested within the national 
framework and adopted by municipalities to mirror the county plans.  Another example is 
that the proposals were written to target the strategic landscape of the entire state; it 
would have been easy to become fixated on what was generally perceived at the time of 
the writing as a South Florida threat.     
3. Structure Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Formalized Structure for Coordination.  The report emphasized 
the need for a formalized structure to be in place prior to future emergency events.  The 
mechanism recommended for implementation of the formalized structure for 
coordination was a thorough revision and enhanced understanding of Florida Statute 
Chapter 252.  The report also recommended that emergency plans of municipalities 
should be consistent with and subject to the applicable county plans to ensure that close 
cooperation and coordination exists in each impacted county. The report recommended 
the adoption of three categories for emergencies: minor, major and catastrophic.  Most of 
the report’s recommendations were subsequently introduced into legislation in the 1993 
Florida legislative session as House Bill 911 and Senate Bill No. 1858, which when 
enacted in 1993, became Chapters 93–211 and 93–128 respectively.49 
2.)  Formalized Processes.  The report noted several recommended 
deadlines for recommendations adopted.   Many individual recommendations were not 
dated.  However, the clear implication from the suspense date for completion and 
submission of the report, six weeks prior to the convening of the 1993 legislative session, 
was that the report’s recommendations were tied to the next convening of the Florida 
legislature. 
3.)  Sufficient Authority of Participants.  The report discussed that 
the committee struggled with the difficult issue of chain of command.  The report noted 
that “counties are charged in the Florida Statutes with being responsible for maintaining  
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emergency preparedness programs for the entire county” and that “the county 
governments are ultimately accountable for meeting the needs of all impacted residents 
within the county.”  
4.)  Role Clarity.  The report emphasized the importance of not 
only establishing roles, but also, of a shared understanding of those roles.  The report 
stated that the relationships among, and roles and responsibilities of, county and 
municipal governments do not seem to be well understood or defined. 
5.)  Dedicated Assets for Collaboration.  The report clearly stressed 
this requirement in many ways—recommending establishment of the Emergency 
Management Trust Fund, creation of an Emergency Support Function for 
communications, establishing collaborative partnerships for sharing of communication 
assets and establishment of a Health and Medical Services Emergency Support Function.  
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Impeding Rules or Policies.  Nothing of significance was noted 
in the report. 
2.)  Inadequate Authority of Participants.  Throughout the report, 
recommendations were typically noted with a caveat for establishment of authority 
through state legislative means.  The authors indicated that they understood the criticality 
of empowering future decision makers with adequate authority.  Recommendation 53 
noted that Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, and other statutes as necessary, should be 
amended to provide each state agency with lead responsibility for an emergency support 
function with authority to promulgate rules necessary to carry out its responsibilities.      
3.)  Inadequate Resources.  This was a major theme throughout the 
report; an entire section is devoted to funding and opens with a discussion that Florida 
devoted insufficient resources to emergency management programs.  What is not 
immediately clear in the report is whether the resources should be equitably dispersed to 
promote intergovernmental cooperation.  It may be surmised that this was the intent, as 
the report discusses the funding was needed at both state and county levels.       
4.)  Lack of Accountability.  Nothing of significance was noted in 
the report. 
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5.)  Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for Collaboration.  The 
report discusses this issue in depth and describes how a lack of established procedures to 
manage intergovernmental coordination contributed greatly to many of the issues 
associated with the Hurricane Andrew response.  The report, in many places, describes 
procedures such as emergency support functions to manage the collaboration.  In some of 
the recommendations, the report acknowledges that procedures need to be established but 
do not provide details of what the procedures should entail.  The critical factor is that the 
report’s authors recognized the importance of the establishment of formal roles and 
procedures for managing collaboration. 
4. Lateral Mechanisms Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Social Capital.  The report gave little indication of already 
established trust and interaction across interorganizational lines.   
2.)  Effective Communication and Information Exchange.  The 
report discusses this area as a significant issue in the response efforts, as agencies 
appeared unclear on their responsibilities and roles.   The report primarily discussed two 
related areas of information: the need for sharing of critical emergency information to the 
public and the need for a coordinated effort of information release and control.  The 
report gave little indication of consideration for the information flow between 
organizations.  
3.)  Technical Interoperability.  Several recommendations 
discussed incorporating computer information systems and software systems such as 
geographic information systems with collective training on these systems.  
Communication equipment upgrades was a consistent theme throughout the report. 
4.)  Combined Training Events.  The report discusses that funding 
constraints had limited the state’s ability to conduct combined training events, such as 
annual hurricane exercises, prior to Hurricane Andrew. 
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b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Familiarity with Other Organizations.  This appeared 
to be an issue.  The report discusses this dynamic in the introduction under the heading of 
“Relationships between Federal, State, County and Municipality Governments Need to be 
Clearly Understood” and there is narrative that the committee spent a considerable 
amount of time grappling with the difficult issue of chain of command.  Chain of 
command may have different meanings depending on what agency is using or hearing the 
term.  The report contained several recommendations relating to liaisons, such as the 
counties serving as liaison for municipalities requesting resources from state or federal 
levels.  The use of liaisons is a practical and accepted manner to gain insight into other 
organizational cultures.     
2.)  Inadequate Communication and Information Sharing.  The 
report discusses how inadequate communication between levels of government 
concerning specific needs impacted post-disaster response and recovery.  In the report’s 
introduction, the committee discusses that improving all aspects of communication, at 
and among all levels of government and with the public and media, must be made a 
priority.   
5. Incentives Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding or Resources.  The 
potential for increased funding for all affected agencies through the establishment of a 
central state trust fund for emergency management created an incentive for increased 
collaboration in future preparedness.  By recommending the Department of Community 
Affairs as the “gatekeeper” for the emergency management trust funds, the Department 
of Community Affairs was placed into a leadership role for building collaborative 
capacity. 
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b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Competition for Resources.  The report notes and 
acknowledges the disparity of allocated emergency management resources between large 
counties and small counties.  It does not note that this is necessarily a problem as it 
recognizes an allocated annual amount per citizen for emergency management.  The 
report recommended that the Florida Legislature vote to establish an Emergency 
Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund to be administered by the Florida Department of 
Community Affairs.  This funding would be a substantial increase from the past as the 
report noted that the state’s general revenue funding to support emergency management 
had decreased by 31 percent over the previous three fiscal years.  Although not covered 
in the report itself, the Florida Senate had previously disapproved similar legislation to 
establish an Emergency Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund, due to controversy over 
a $2.00 assessment on homeowners’ insurance policies and a $4.00 assessment on 
commercial policies.  North and Central Florida senators had defeated previous attempts 
in 1990, 1991 and 1992 to enact similar legislation as they were resistant to their 
constituents paying for what they perceived, at the time, as a South Florida issue.  The 
magnitude of the Hurricane Andrew devastation, combined with a fierce winter storm in 
March 1993, convinced the resistant senators that extreme storms were not just a South 
Florida concern and the legislation passed.50   
2.)  Territoriality.  State regional interests were a factor in the 
implementation of recommendations.  North and Central Florida were not receptive to 
funding south Florida preparation for disaster.  Media attention focused on Florida may 
have mitigated this dynamic since there appeared to be little distinction made between 
South Florida and other parts of the state when discussed in a national dialogue. 
                                                 
50 Comfort, Louise K., Boin, Arjen & Demchak, Chris C., Designing Resilience: Preparing for 





philip%20d%20lewis%20florida%20AND%20the%20lewis%20report&f=false (accessed October 3, 
2011).  
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3.)  Organizational Level Distrust and Lack of Mutual Respect.  
Nothing of significance was noted in the report. 
6. People Practices Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, Expertise, Roles, and 
Perspectives.  As previously discussed, the report’s compilation was indicative of a 
respect for other parties’ interests, expertise, roles and perspectives.  The committee went 
to great effort to include a myriad of agency and interested stakeholders’ thoughts and 
perspectives in order to develop a robust and thorough analysis of the current situation 
and to provide a roadmap for future efforts. 
2.)  Perseverance/Commitment.  The report has little discussion of 
the people who responded to Hurricane Andrew.  The introduction starts with a 
commendation to all who responded to Hurricane Andrew and states that the 
effectiveness of the effort to respond to and recover from the magnitude of the 
devastation represents a triumph of the human spirit over significant adversity.  The 
report does mention the word “people” 46 times, and it is always in the context of the 
customers being served—people of the state of Florida.  This may have been one of the 
greatest success factors in the strategic aftermath of Hurricane Andrew—Florida state 
officials recognized that emergency management was a collaborative effort between the 
government and the people of the state. 
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Competency.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
2.)  Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity.  Nothing of significance was 
noted in the report. 
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Table 3.   List of Collaborative Success Factors Noted In Hurricane Andrew 1992 
Report 
Domains Success Factors Hurricane 
Andrew 
Purpose  Felt Need to Collaborate + 
 Common Goal + 
 Willingness to Address Other Agencies 
Interests or Cross-Agency Goals versus 
Local Organizational Goals 
+ 
Structure Formalized Structure for Coordination + 
 Formalized Processes + 
 Sufficient Authority of Participants + 
 Role Clarity  
 Dedicated Assets for Collaboration  
Lateral Mechanisms Social Capital  
 Effective Communication and Information 
Exchange 
 
 Technical Interoperability  
 Combined Training Events  
Incentives Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding 
or Resources 
+ 
People Practices Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, 
Expertise, Roles, Perspectives 
+ 
 Perseverance/Commitment + 
Table 4.   List Of Collaborative Barrier Factors Noted In Hurricane Andrew 1992 
Report 
Domains Barrier Factors Hurricane 
Andrew 
Purpose  Divergent Goals + 
 Focus on Regional or Local Agency 
Concerns 
+ 
 Lack of Goal Clarity + 
 Not Adaptable to Interests of Other 
Organization 
 
Structure Impeding Rules or Policies  
 Inadequate Authority of Participants + 
 Inadequate Resources + 
 Lack of Accountability  
 Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for 
Collaborating 
+ 




Domains Barrier Factors Hurricane 
Andrew 
 Inadequate Communication and 
Information Sharing 
+ 
Incentives Competition for Resources + 
 Territoriality + 
 Organization-Level Distrust and Lack of 
Mutual Respect 
 
People Practices Lack of Competency  
 Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity  
7. Other Factors 
a. Leadership 
Strong leadership can be an incentive to collaborate.  Governor Chiles 
displayed this trait by issue of Executive Order 92-291 on September 11, only three 
weeks after Hurricane Andrew made landfall on August 25.  The commission’s structure, 
consisting of 25 technical advisory experts, and its hearing from a wide range of 
witnesses, created an atmosphere of collaboration.       
b. Collaborative Learning 
Recommendation 52 suggests a post-disaster response and recovery 
element as a component of Florida Statute 252, Emergency Management and the Florida 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.  As a functional area of the response and 
recovery element, recommendation 52 called for training at the state level through the use 
of periodic exercises, a continuous training program for key individuals and alternates, 
detailed training manuals and operational guidelines.  Recommendation 54 called for the 
same training processes to be implemented at the county level.   
8. Conclusion  
Table 3 and Table 4 indicate that many factors to start the process of 
building collaborative capacity within Florida Emergency Management efforts were 
implemented, albeit perhaps, without consciously recognizing that their recommendations 
would lead to enhanced collaborative capacity, by the Lewis Commission.  The 
commission recognized that had been glaringly lacking success factors prior to Hurricane 
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Andrew’s landfall and in the immediate two weeks post-landfall.  Their 
recommendations—perhaps intuitively on their part—set the stage for Florida to begin 
building collaborative capacity within the Florida Comprehensive Disaster Management 
arena.  The work of the commission should be heralded as a success story in the building 
of interorganizational collaborative capacity.  
B. WILDFIRES 1998 
1. Background 
The wildfires of 1998 were caused by another extreme weather phenomenon 
experienced by Florida’s residents.  The first three months of 1998 were characterized by 
widespread flooding across the state as a result of an El Nino effect.  Record rainfalls 
from January–March 1998, in Florida, caused streams and rivers to top their banks and 
damage property and cause evacuations.  A rapid transition to a La Nina effect caused the 
rains to stop and Florida experienced the hottest and driest conditions in the past 104 
years, creating extreme fire hazard conditions for several months.  During this drought 
condition, Florida experienced massive wildfires across the state beginning with an 
Apalachicola fire that started on May 25.  Eventually, approximately 4,000 firefighters 
from Florida and over 10,000 firefighters and emergency response personnel from 47 
states—as well as more than 150 aircraft—would battle against nearly 2,300 separate 
wildfires that consumed almost 500,000 acres of the state.  Costs for the 1998 Florida 
wildfire event soared to over $160 million by the end of calendar year 1998 with over 
300 homes damaged or destroyed. The value of lost timber, alone, was estimated at over 
$300 million.  The number of acres in Florida burned in the 1998 wildfires represented an 
increase of more than 1700 percent from Florida’s typical five-year average.  
The Florida governor at the time, the late Lawton Chiles, issued Executive Order 
98–201 to establish the gGovernor’s Wildfire Response and Mitigation Review 
Committee to record lessons learned from the 1998 wildfire response efforts.51  The 
committee met on six different occasions and conducted four public hearings during the 
                                                 
51 Lewis, Philip D. Through the Flames…An Assessment of Florida’s Wildfires of 1998 (Tallahassee, 
FL: Report of the Governor’s Wildfire Response and Mitigation Review Committee, 1998).  
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months of September, October, November and December 1998.  Using similar 
methodology as the Hurricane Andrew Governor’s lessons-learned commission, the panel 
assembled a team of representatives from 22 agencies, organizations and the public 
supported by approximately forty technical advisors.  The committee received both 
written and oral testimony from technical experts, officials involved in the response and 
members of the impacted public in order to formulate consensus recommendations for the 
governor, legislature, the Florida Congressional Delegation and local officials, for 
enhancing and sustaining Florida’s wildfire programs in the future.  The committee 
utilized a questionnaire survey regarding wildfire response to focus initial hearings, and 
also solicited comments from interested public and private organizations, as well as the 
general public through the internet.  The committee’s structure was organized by dividing 
into three groups of appointed members and technical advisors: mitigation and 
prevention, response, and recovery, with each sub-committee formulating 
recommendations for presentation to the entire committee for discussion and consensus.   
The Florida firestorm of 1998 was a clarion call to many in the Florida emergency 
response field in that the state had become focused on response to hurricanes, tornados 
and floods.  The devastation caused by massive wildfires alerted the entire state, 
especially members of the State Emergency Response Team, which was formed in 1994 
that emergencies come in many surprising and unexpected forms.  An argument can be 
made that this seminal event brought into clearer focus the need for comprehensive 
disaster management.  This event further tested and validated the measures that had been 
put into place by the state in the past five years, since publication of the Hurricane 
Andrew Lewis Report.  Earlier tests had included a 1993 winter storm, an active 1995 
hurricane season—to include Hurricane Opal which was the tenth deadliest recorded 
storm on record—and the El Nino floods.  The 1998 Wildfire event was also the first 
major test by Florida of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) since 
Congress consented to the Compact in 1996.  EMAC had originally been formed as the 




Association as a result of lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew’s devastation of 
Florida in 1992.  In 1995, the Southern Governors Association opened membership to all 
United States of America states and territories.52   
The commission’s report consisted of a total of 90 recommendations and 77 
pages.  From these 90 recommendations, the committee submitting the report noted four 




• wildland fuel reduction 
It is worth noting that the Florida Division of Emergency Management had, by 
this time in its development, recognized and embraced the concept of inter-agency 
cooperation.  The Division had reacted to hurricanes in 1995—notably Allison, Erin and 
Opal—and built their response efforts around an inter-agency approach patterned after 
the National Response Framework.  By this time, there were a total of 16 Emergency 
Support Functions within the State Emergency Response Team. 
2. Purpose Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Felt Need to Collaborate.  Recommendations 1–6 demonstrate 
recognition of the need to collaborate; they all fall into what the committee categorized as 
Issue A titled Enhancing Intergovernmental Relationships and Coordinated Action.  The 
committee discussed the need to harness statutory responsibility with the practical job of 
managing urban-wildland fire response interface across the local, county, state and 
federal continuum.  The centerpiece recommendation for the report is listed as 1, which 
calls for establishing funding resources for development of an integrated Wildfire 
Response Plan to enhance intergovernmental relationships and better coordinate 
                                                 
52 United States Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: 
Enhancing EMAC’s Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster 
Response (GAO-07-854) 2007, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/GAO/d07854.pdf (accessed October 4, 
2011). 
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operational response to wildfires.  This plan would include mechanisms for activation, 
mobilization, response, resourcing and periodic training exercises.    
2.)  Common Goal.  The common goal of the participating 
agencies appeared to stem from what the report utilized as its three primary categories—
wildfire response, recovery from wildfires and prevention/mitigation of wildfires.  The 
committee recognized that simply extinguishing the wildfires in 1998 was only one 
component for success.  The 90 recommendations made by the committee each fell under 
one of the three primary categories.   
3.)  Willingness to Address Other Agencies’ Interests or Cross-
Agency Goals Versus Local Organization Goals.  The forming of the Wildfire Response 
and Mitigation Review Committee was, by itself, a strategic action to collaborate 
between the whole of government and interested stakeholders.  Twenty-two agencies and 
organizations participated, with additional input from the general public and impacted 
groups.  This seeking of input from multiple perspectives is a strategic action for 
collaboration.  Milward and Provan,53 from the University of Arizona, term this type of 
approach Community Capacity Building Networks with the key characterizations of 
having the primary goal to build social capital in community-based settings, having a 
purpose both current and future oriented, and often involving a wide range of agencies 
with many emergent sub-networks to address different needs that may arise.  The report 
discussed exactly the sub-networks mentioned by Milward and Provan when their first 
recommendation called for a district level District Wildfire Services Council (DWSC) 
made up of representatives from  the Division of Forestry, the Florida Fire Chiefs 
Association, the Division of State Fire Marshal and local and county career and volunteer 
fire departments with the Division of Emergency Management, county emergency 
management, Florida National Guard and federal agencies providing liaison as required.    
                                                 
53 Milward, H. Brinton and Provan, Keith G., A Managers Guide to Choosing and Using 
Collaborative Networks, Networks and Partnership Series, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 
2006, www.businessofgovernment,org (accessed October 4, 2011). 
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b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Divergent Goals.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
2.)  Focus on Regional or Local Agency Concerns.  The Florida 
Division of Forestry has statutory responsibility for wildfires within the state and has 
statewide resources to carry out this responsibility.  The report noted that the urban-
wildland interface fire response belongs to local, county, state and federal emergency 
service responders working in an inter-agency close partnership.  Much of the report 
focuses on the establishment of structures and frameworks to enhance these partnerships.  
The report implies that there was some pre-event focus on individual agency concerns; 
one example is that aviation fire suppression equipment was incompatible with other 
SERT aviation assets. 
3.)  Lack of Goal Clarity.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
4.)  Not Adaptable to Interests of Other Organizations.  The report 
discussed how unified commands should utilize input from public and private land 
managers through a liaison position in order to represent their interests.  The implication 
from this recommendation is that this input may not have always been solicited during 
the 1998 wildfires.  The report notes that their knowledge of their land and available 
resources can provide invaluable intelligence and assistance to fire commanders.  An 
assumption can be made that emergency professionals may have been concerned with 
safety and liability issues.  Other discussion in the report reflected on previous practices 
of limiting prescribed burning as a preventive measure designed to limit potential for 
catastrophic fire events such as the 1998 firestorm.  The report indicated that local and 
state quality air ordinances had caused an overabundance of fuel sources and that there 
was a need to balance the ordinances designed to protect air quality with the need to 
eliminate wildfire fuel sources. 
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3. Structure Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Formalized Structure for Coordination.  As previously 
mentioned, the formal structure recommended by the committee primarily consisted of 
establishment of a Wildfire Response Plan.  The plan called for leveraging already 
existent Division of Forestry districts to establish a step-process ascending from local to 
county to state to federal as required.  The recommendations also called for local and 
county plans to be developed within the framework of the Wildfire Response Plan.  
2.)  Formalized Processes.  The report completion was prior to the 
convening of the 1999 Florida legislative session so that recommendations could be 
considered by the Florida House and Senate. 
3.)  Sufficient Authority of Participants.  The report discussed that 
the Division of Forestry is the statutory designee for wildfire response.  It also discussed 
the application of criteria or “triggers” that would be used to move the Incident 
Command Structure to another appropriate level.  The report also discussed the 
utilization of the Incident Management System (IMS) as the authority for participants 
involved in collaborative efforts and unified command structures. 
4.)  Role Clarity.  The report seemed to indicate role clarity being 
already established and well understood at the basic level by following the provisions of 
the Incident Management System (IMS) that called for the first arriving agency to assume 
command of the incident.  The ambiguity that surfaced occurred in the interface between 
the wildland areas and the urban and suburban areas.  Here is where the committee’s 
report discussed collaboration using a unified command operation between agencies.    
5.)  Dedicated Assets for Collaboration.  The focus in this report 
was on fire suppression equipment and the need for prepositioned supplies prior to 
incidents occurring.  Aircraft that had the capability of being interoperable with fire 
suppression equipment was discussed along with communications equipment that 
provided interoperability.   
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b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Impeding Rules or Policies.  As previously mentioned, the 
need to balance clean air ordinance requirements with the need for prescribed burning, 
was discussed.  Also discussed were clarifying or amending rules to facilitate fuel 
management strategies while taking into consideration rules for traffic safety, insurance 
and liability factors, right-of-ways and land management.    
2.)  Inadequate Authority of Participants.  Nothing of significance 
was noted in the report. 
3.)  Inadequate Resources.  The report made recommendations for 
increased funding, especially in the area of communications interoperability and training.  
This discussion was especially noted as an area of concern for agencies other than the 
lead agency for wildfires.  Resources for wildfire prevention and mitigation were 
highlighted as a resource shortfall prior to the 1998 wildfire event. 
4.)  Lack of Accountability.  Nothing of significance was noted in 
the report. 
5.)  Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for Collaboration.  The 
report discussed the utilization of Unified Command as a component of the Incident 
Management System.  The report also discussed the need for representation from the 
Division of State Fire Marshals and the Florida Fire Chiefs Association whenever a 
Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (MAC) is established by the Division of Forestry.  
The report also emphasized the need for all participants to have knowledge of the existing 
formal roles and procedures for managing collaborative efforts.  The primary areas of 
concern appeared to be the urban-wildland interface areas and management of large area 
complexes that covered several incident sites concurrently. Emphasis was made on 
training exercises designed to train participants in the management of unified commands.  
4. Lateral Mechanisms Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Social Capital.  It’s interesting to note that many of the same 
personnel who participated in the 1992 (Hurricane Andrew) Disaster Planning and 
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Response Review Committee also participated in the 1998 Governors’ Wildfire Response 
and Mitigation Review Committee.  As a result, a notable thematic change in language 
occurs from the Hurricane Andrew Report to the Wildfires 1998 Report.  In the 
Hurricane Andrew report, the tone was often in the form of “we must collaborate more” 
whereas the Wildfires 1998 report has a noticeable tone of “how can we collaborate 
more?”  The wording is subtle but speaks volumes in that the interpersonal networks 
facilitating collaborative capacity has now expanded and the underlying question is not 
whether there is value in collaboration, but how to encourage it more.  The focus has 
shifted towards what systems can be put into place to network more with other agencies.  
2.)  Effective Communication and Information Exchange.  In 
addition to discussion of collaborative efforts for public information, the report provided 
several recommendations calling for information sharing between the Division of 
Forestry and the Department of Insurance.  Examples of creative incentives for 
collaboration were creating new standards for effective wildfire mitigation practices to 
share with architects, engineers and landscape planners, and collaborating with the DOI 
to develop incentives for homeowners to have safe firebreak zones around dwellings. 
3.)  Technical Interoperability.  Inadequate communications 
interoperability between responders continued to be a theme in the report.  Especially 
noteworthy was the discussion of airspace management challenges that could lead to 
safety issues when operating in restricted visibility conditions.  The report did not 
mention the relatively new State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in detail, but it 
was an important enabler for collaboration during the Wildfire event as well as the floods 
that occurred January–March 1998.  The new SEOC was completed and occupied in July 
2006.  The SEOC provided new technologies at the time, as well as adequate space for 
collaborative efforts to occur at the state level. 
4.)  Combined Training Events.  Discussion in recommendation 1 
discusses that a Wildfire Response Plan should be developed and which should include 
an annual training program to include exercises between training participants.  The clear 
implication is that these types of events had been lacking in previous years.   
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b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Familiarity with Other Organizations.  The report’s 
emphasis on conducting more inter-agency training exercises indicate that this was an 
area of concern during the 1998 wildfires.  The various command structures associated 
with management of fires spread across wide geographic areas, with a myriad of 
government and private organizations responding, is a challenging process.  The report 
indicated that there were issues associated with familiarity, even within the state-level 
fire-response agencies, such as the Division of Forestry and the State Fire Marshals.   
2.)  Inadequate Communication and Information Sharing.  
Communication interoperability between the responding agencies was an area of concern 
in the report.  As one example, communication interoperability was discussed as a safety 
issue associated with airspace management during fire suppression efforts.  Another area 
of concern in the report were communication strategies to keep the public informed 
during the crisis; examples were provided where many local residents only became aware 
of the need to evacuate when law enforcement personnel came to their door to advise 
them of evacuation orders.  There was also discussion of needing to enhance information 
sharing between public information officers at the various levels of government to 
preclude conflicting public releases of information. 
5. Incentives Domain  
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding or Resources.  By 
providing funding from the general revenue fund for all affected agencies and making the 
Division of Forestry the administrator of wildfire funding, an incentive for collaborative 
efforts was established.  Establishing the Division of Forestry as the fund facilitator for 
wildfires and the Division of Emergency Management the fund facilitator for emergency 
management at first appears counterintuitive, but may actually have provided additional 
incentive for collaboration by setting up separate networks for collaboration and, thereby, 
providing redundancy.  Other discussions relating to funding were addressed in 
recommendations that included improving communication and fire suppression 
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equipment interoperability to enhance interorganizational collaborative efforts.  
Recommendations were also made for funding of interorganizational training such as 
providing fire suppression training to National Guard aviation personnel.   
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Competition for Resources.  Nothing of significance was noted 
in the report. 
2.)  Territoriality.  This appeared to be a theme throughout the 
report based on much discussion of management of the urban-wildland areas and fire 
response on private lands.   
3.)  Organizational Level Distrust and Lack of Mutual Respect.  
Nothing of significance was noted in the report. 
6. People Practices Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, Expertise, Roles, and 
Perspectives.  The report had dialogue stressing the expertise of specific parties and the 
roles of personnel.  There was emphasis placed on wildfire training for individuals and 
organizations.   The report indicated that the collaborative capacity of people had been 
enhanced as a result of actions taken by the state, after Hurricane Andrew, and as a result 
of people having worked together as members of the State Emergency Response Team. 
2.)  Perseverance/Commitment.  The report discusses that a total of 
130,000 people were evacuated from their homes during the firestorm with over 10,000 
firefighters from across the nation participating for almost two months.  The safety record 
of no fire deaths of responders or citizens is heralded as a result of the commitment of a 
dedicated team of professionals. 
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Competency.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
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2.)  Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity.  Nothing of significance was 
noted in the report. 
Table 5.   List of Collaborative Success Factors Noted in Wildfires 1998 Report 
Domains Success Factors Wildfires 
1998 
Purpose  Felt Need to Collaborate + 
 Common Goal + 
 Willingness to Address Other Agencies 
Interests or Cross-Agency Goals versus 
Local Organizational Goals 
+ 
Structure Formalized Structure for Coordination  
 Formalized Processes  
 Sufficient Authority of Participants + 
 Role Clarity + 
 Dedicated Assets for Collaboration  
Lateral Mechanisms Social Capital + 
 Effective Communication and Information 
Exchange 
 
 Technical Interoperability  
 Combined Training Events  
Incentives Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding 
or Resources 
+ 
People Practices Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, 
Expertise, Roles, Perspectives 
+ 
 Perseverance/Commitment + 
Table 6.   List of Collaborative Barrier Factors Noted in Wildfires 1998 Report 
Domains Barrier Factors Wildfires 
1998 
Purpose  Divergent Goals  
 Focus on Regional or Local Agency 
Concerns 
+ 
 Lack of Goal Clarity  
 Not Adaptable to Interests of Other 
Organization 
+ 
Structure Impeding Rules or Policies + 
 Inadequate Authority of Participants  
 Inadequate Resources + 




Domains Barrier Factors Wildfires 
1998 
 Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for 
Collaborating 
+ 
Lateral Mechanisms Lack of Familiarity with Other 
Organizations 
+ 
 Inadequate Communication and 
Information Sharing 
+ 
Incentives Competition for Resources  
 Territoriality + 
 Organization-Level Distrust and Lack of 
Mutual Respect 
 
People Practices Lack of Competency  
 Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity  
7. Other Factors 
1.)  Leadership.  Governor Chiles displayed leadership by issuing 
Executive Order 98-201 on August 13, 1998.  Although the worst of the fires were over 
by the end of July 1998, many fires continued to burn for many weeks.  However, it was 
recognized that recommendations needed to be crafted and published prior to the next 
Florida legislative session in the spring of 1999.  This timing turned out to crucial since 
there was a continuing La Nina effect and there was another wildfire event in summer of 
1999.      
2.)  Collaborative Learning.  The report stressed the need for the 
Florida Legislature to designate the Division of Forestry as the lead agency for the 
development of a collaborative Florida Center for Wildfire and Forest Resource 
Management Training.   
3.)  Language of the Report.  The report consisted of 90 
recommendations.  It is noteworthy that over 50 of these recommendations were made in 
the form of some type of interorganizational collaboration between two or more agencies.  
The words partnership, coordination and agreements were utilized in many of the report’s 
recommendations.  The commission compiling the report clearly recognized that success 
was to be gained through collaborative efforts between federal, state, county and 
municipalities as well as private organizations and the populace. 
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8. Conclusion 
The above tables indicates that the Florida CDM enterprise’s collaborative 
capacity had matured—likely as a result of collaborative processes implemented 
stemming from lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Trust had grown 
between agencies as well as trust in the collaborative process itself.  Social capital was 
now being built as interpersonal networks were expanding through shared training 
exercises, meetings and more frequent interaction stemming from previous emergency 
events.  The primary challenge for the SERT was a new threat profile that required new 
procedures and mission profiles to be created.  Technical interoperability was expanding 
as emerging technologies were leveraged.  Information exchange increased through 
expanded computer and communications systems. Respect for other parties’ expertise 
and roles was enhanced as organizations collaborated on the wildfire response, recovery 
and mitigation. 
C. SUMMER OF STORMS 
1. Background 
The 2004 Florida season of storms was unprecedented for the number of major 
storms impacting one state during the same season.  Five separate storm events: Tropical 
Storm Bonnie, Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne impacted Florida within a 
catastrophic six-week period between August 12 and September 26, 2004.  Eventually, 
all 67 Florida counties would receive a federal disaster declaration.  At the time, the total 
costs for the storm damage was the most costly total natural disaster in United States 
history.  Due to the magnitude of the series of severe weather events, all state agencies 
were engaged to an unprecedented degree.   
The Florida National Guard was a major force provider to the Florida State 
Emergency Response Team in 2004 with a total of 7,600 Soldiers and Airmen called to 
active duty for defense support to civil authorities through the five storms.  Adding to the 
complexity of the mobilization was a reduced pool of National Guard personnel and 
equipment to draw upon due to Global War on Terror deployments.  As such, an 
unprecedented use of Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and 
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Memorandums of Agreement were utilized to augment Florida State Emergency 
Response Teams.  These inter-state mobilizations and deployments were a new chapter in 
collaborative emergency management and served as a dress rehearsal for Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005.   
The Florida National Guard hosted a Joint Universal Lessons Learned System 
(JULLS) After Action Report/Lessons Learned Conference in November 2004 and 
published a subsequent written report54 on January 19, 2005.  This report is worth further 
research in the interest of discovering what role interorganizational collaborative capacity 
played in the success of the Florida 2004 emergency response effort.   
Florida has received many favorable comments on its hurricane response efforts. 
Gerencser, Van Lee, Napalitano, Kelly and Isaacson state in their book titled 
Megacommunites that: 
…during the severe 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a series of high-
powered hurricanes and tropical storms (Hurricanes Charley, Frances, 
Ivan, Jeanne, Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and Tropical Storms 
Bonnie, Ophelia, and Tammy) struck Florida.  The state’s government, 
business and civil organizations quickly mobilized, working together—as 
they had planned and trained to do—to provide aid for relief and recovery.  
This new model for collective leadership stands in stark contrast to the 
efforts following Hurricane Katrina.  And indeed, Florida played an 
integral role in supporting southern Mississippi and Louisiana during 
Katrina’s aftermath.  Within hours of the storm’s landfall, Florida began 
deploying more than 3,700 first responders to the affected areas.55 
Kathleen Tierney, Director of the National Hazards Center at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder, stated that “Florida is being looked upon as one of the very best 
prepared states.”56 Wall Street journalists Cooper and Block state in a 2006 book that “as 
disaster experts like to say, FEMA didn’t rescue Florida, Florida rescued FEMA.  Of all  
 
                                                 
54 Burnett, Douglas, Florida National Guard Summer Storms 2004 After Action Report (St. Augustine, 
FL: Florida Department of Military Affairs, 2005). 
55 Gerencser et al., Megacommunities, 26–27.   
56 Stephey, M. J., “FEMA Chief W. Craig Fugate,” Time, March 6, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883485,00.html (accessed April 19, 2011). 
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the southern states vulnerable to hurricane strikes, Florida was the best prepared. Thanks, 
in part, to the debacle following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the state had gotten serious 
about preparedness.”57   
2. Purpose Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Felt Need to Collaborate.  An interesting dynamic occurred 
during the Florida season of storms in 2004.  Because of the extreme operational tempo 
of the storms and the felt need to collaborate in order to meet the local county 
requirements, decentralized validation of mission requests became a frequent and 
recommended pattern.  This decentralized validation meant that mission requests for state 
assets could be validated for approval at the local level, without having to be approved at 
the centralized state level first, as is the customary procedure.  The felt need to 
collaborate overrode the procedural status quo and trust between agencies became the 
“coin of the realm” in that the state used a Forward SERT located in heavily impacted 
areas and relied even more heavily than in the past on the county level to make informed 
decisions with integrity.  In return, the county level trusted the state agency personnel to 
back up their decisions and provide requested resources.  Because of a felt need to 
collaborate in order to meet the common goal mission requirements, speed became more 
of an important tenet than standard procedure.  Also adding to a felt need to collaborate 
was a desire by senior leaders—perhaps due to recognizing the impact Hurricane Andrew 
had on the 1992 Presidential race—not to allow the response to the 2004 season of storms 
become a factor in the 2004 presidential race.  A standard was established early in the 
2004 response efforts to have no impact on the presidential race. 
2.)  Common Goal.  Because of the vast damage to the entire state, 
a common goal of timely response became more pronounced than may have been the 
case in previous past response events.  The report indicated that there was a sense of 
“We’re all in this together” as the damage became more extensive over the entire state.  
                                                 
57 Cooper, Christopher & Block, Robert, Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland 
Security, 86 (New York: Times Books: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2006).  
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For the Florida National Guard, this dynamic became more apparent as almost half of the 
state’s National Guard armories were damaged by the storms.  It was also significant that 
so many Soldiers and Airmen’s homes were threatened and damaged, which added to the 
sense of mission importance for support of civil authorities.  Support, trust and guidance 
for collaborative partnerships by the State Coordinating Officer were made clear by the 
report as a key to success.   
3.)  Willingness to Address Other Agencies Interests or Cross-
Agency Goals Versus Local Organization Goals.  The report discussed that the State 
Coordinating Officer considered Florida National Guard rest and refit requirements 
between storms when supporting and de-conflicting local mission requests.  This was 
significant in that many Soldiers and Airmen had recently returned from deployments and 
many of their own homes and local armories had been damaged by storms.  An 
assumption can be made that the same considerations were given to other state agencies 
impacted by the storms.    
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Divergent Goals.  Divergent goals were caused as a result of 
the succession of storms over an extended period.  The report discusses that the rapid 
succession of hurricanes required that planning for the next mission was concurrent with 
execution from the last.  Adding to the complexity was the geographical area of concern; 
the entire state was impacted before the end of the storm period concluded.  The 
management and balancing of so many divergent goals was a major challenge for 
emergency managers.    
2.)  Focus on Regional or Local Agency Concerns.  The report 
discusses that the Florida emergency management paradigm is to focus on impacted 
counties.  Hence, focus on the response to support impacted counties is not a barrier in 
the context of Florida emergency management.  The Florida SERT collective effort to 
support local county agency needs can be considered a success factor. 
3.)  Lack of Goal Clarity.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
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4.)  Not Adaptable to Interests of Other Organizations.  Nothing of 
significance was noted in the report. 
3. Structure Domain  
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Formalized Structure for Coordination.  The report 
discusses that EMAC was a lifesaver that significantly enhanced capabilities and filled 
the gap created by federal deployments.  Many units from the Florida National Guard 
were deployed overseas in support of the Global War on Terror.  By this stage in the 
maturation process of the Florida emergency management program, the focus had shifted 
from strategic actions toward more focus on social capital and trust between agencies.  
Strategic action now shifted from collaboration between state agencies and towards inter-
state strategic action.  As one example, a memorandum of understanding was worked 
between the Florida National Guard, National Guard Bureau and other states to facilitate 
the use of other state National Guard security forces to provide “on-the-street” security 
within Florida if the need arose.  This would have been the first time that National Guard 
from another state performed armed security missions within the state of Florida.   
The Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
(CEMP) is the formalized framework structure for coordination.  The CEMP is nested in 
the National Response Plan (now National Response Framework).  Within the Florida 
National Guard is the Joint Operations Plan—Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities/Homeland Defense (JOPLAN-DSCA/HD) that is also nested and provides a 
conceptual framework for collaborative efforts to meet common goals and mission sets.  
The JOPLAN-DSCA/HD became a critical element as the Florida Air National Guard 
units, for the first time in Florida State Active Duty missions, were mobilized for the 
season of storms and their integration became another interorganizational collaborative 
capacity-building exercise.   
2.)  Formalized Processes.  Interestingly, the report discusses that 
success was enabled by moving away from the established formalized structure for 
mission validation to a decentralized and previously unutilized mission validation process 
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during the first 72 hours.  Decision makers made a conscious decision to adapt the 
formalized structure to facilitate increased speed and enhanced positive relationships with 
supported civil authorities.   
3.)  Sufficient Authority of Participants.  The report discussed the 
importance of the State Coordinating Officer providing authority to agencies to be 
proactive in the prepositioning of resources, requesting additional needed resources 
through EMAC and rightsizing resources to meet mission requirements.  Providing 
authority for collaborative efforts was key to successfully maintaining the correct 
operational tempo in a highly dynamic and quickly evolving environment. 
4.)  Role Clarity.  Role clarity was discussed as a success factor in 
that potential EMAC assets capabilities were listed, as opposed to just listing what type 
of unit they were.  Decision makers required a capability set in order to make informed 
decisions when matching mission requirements with capabilities. 
5.)  Dedicated Assets for Collaboration.  The use of liaison 
personnel is emphasized as a key to success in joint and civil-military operations in the 
report.  As an example, military support liaison officers were assigned to each county 
level receiving support.  The report emphasized an understanding of who the liaisons 
work for, and their understanding of the capabilities of the agency they represent.  A new 
procedure was effectively implemented by the State Emergency Response Team where a 
Forward SERT was established at major impacted locations to synchronize collaborative 
efforts and to enhance response timeliness; this was emphasized as a key to success in 
that missions could be validated and tasked much more expediently.  A National Guard 
Bureau liaison attached to the state was also emphasized as key to EMAC success.   
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Impeding Rules or Policies.  The report discussed the 
importance of synchronizing Department of Defense Northern Command chain of 
command structure with that of the National Guard.  The practice of having one military 
chain of command structure known as Title 10/Title 32 “dual-hatting” was still in a 
developmental stage during this period and established procedures for training 
requirements had not been effectively set into policy.   
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2.)  Inadequate Authority of Participants.  Discussion in the report 
concerned the legitimacy of militia groups volunteering for duty and how their 
participation raised security, legal and safety concerns.   
3.)  Inadequate Resources.  Nothing of significance was noted in 
the report. 
4.)  Lack of Accountability.  Nothing of significance was noted in 
the report. 
5.)  Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for Collaboration.  
Nothing of significance was noted in the report. 
4. Lateral Mechanisms Domain  
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Social Capital.  Social capital appeared to be a major theme 
throughout the report.  Examples include the discussion of trust between the Governor, 
the State Coordinating Officer, the Adjutant General of Florida and other key leaders.  
The trust between these key leaders was repeatedly mentioned as a success enabler that 
facilitated a more rapid decision-making process.   
2.)  Effective Communication and Information Exchange.  The 
report discussed that communication and information exchange was enhanced by 
reducing line of communication distances.  Senior leaders deployed closer to the area of 
operations and formed Forward State Emergency Response Teams to enable faster 
decision making.  The use of liaisons at every level of operations also enhanced effective 
communication and information exchange.   
3.)  Technical Interoperability.  Technical interoperability is 
discussed in the report as both a success factor and a liability factor.  New equipment 
installed in the Joint Emergency Operations Center enhanced interoperability.  EMAC 
assets received from other states enhanced interoperability.  Continued development of 
communication and other technical assets to enhance interoperability was recommended 
as expectations of interoperability continued to increase. 
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4.)  Combined Training Events:  The report did not specifically 
discuss past training events as a key to success.  However, the report did mention the 
experience of key leaders and formed partnerships as a success factor.  Much of this 
experience and the partnerships that had been developed were at least partly a result of 
past combined training events such as annual statewide hurricane exercises, the 
governor’s annual hurricane conference, RECON training, State Emergency Operations 
Center exercises and other exercises. 
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Familiarity with Other Organizations.  Nothing of 
significance was noted in the report. 
2.)  Inadequate Communication and Information Sharing.  Nothing 
of significance was noted in the report.   
5. Incentives Domain  
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding or Resources.  The 
design of the mission validation system employed facilitates that collaboration is required 
for the release of resources.  Division of Emergency Management officials at the State 
Emergency Operations Center or at a Forward SERT serve as a mission validation 
approval center to release resources.  Hence, no single agency can effectively employ 
resources without collaboration being conducted to validate mission requests.  Likewise, 
resource allocation is managed through a similar process. 
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Competition for Resources.  Nothing of significance was noted 
in the report. 
2.)  Territoriality.  Nothing of significance was noted in the report. 
3.)  Organizational Level Distrust and Lack of Mutual Respect. 
Nothing of significance was noted in the report. 
 71 
6. People Practices Domain 
a. Success Factors 
1.)  Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, Expertise, Roles, and 
Perspectives.  Repeatedly the report discusses the importance of other agency leaders’ 
trust, expertise and support for collaborative efforts.  The experience level of senior 
leaders was consistently discussed, as well as how each agency had a supportive 
perspective for the needs of collaborating agencies. 
2.)  Perseverance/Commitment.  Attitude and morale of the 
participating personnel is stressed in the report as a key to success.  This is especially 
noteworthy when considering that more than half of participating personnel had returned 
from federal mobilizations and deployments within the past few months before being 
called to State Active Duty in support of defense support to civil authorities.  In addition, 
many participating personnel were also dealing with extensive damage to their own 
properties while supporting hurricane response efforts.  The report also stresses the 
perseverance and resiliency of the impacted citizens as a key to success.  
b. Barrier Factors 
1.)  Lack of Competency.  Nothing of significance was noted in the 
report. 
2.)  Arrogance, Hospitality, Animosity.  Nothing of significance 
was noted in the report. 
Table 7.   List of Collaborative Success Factors Noted in Summer of Storms 2004 
Report 
Domains Success Factors Summer 
Storms 
2004 
Purpose  Felt Need to Collaborate + 
 Common Goal + 
 Willingness to Address Other Agencies 
Interests or Cross-Agency Goals versus 
Local Organizational Goals 
+ 
Structure Formalized Structure for Coordination + 
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Domains Success Factors Summer 
Storms 
2004 
 Formalized Processes + 
 Sufficient Authority of Participants + 
 Role Clarity + 
 Dedicated Assets for Collaboration + 
Lateral Mechanisms Social Capital + 
 Effective Communication and Information 
Exchange 
+ 
 Technical Interoperability + 
 Combined Training Events + 
Incentives Collaboration as a Prerequisite for Funding 
or Resources 
+ 
People Practices Respect for Other Parties’ Interests, 
Expertise, Roles, Perspectives 
+ 
 Perseverance/Commitment + 
Table 8.   List of Collaborative Barrier Factors Noted in Summer of Storms 2004 
Report 
Domains Barrier Factors Summer 
Storms 
2004 
Purpose  Divergent Goals + 
 Focus on Regional or Local Agency 
Concerns 
 
 Lack of Goal Clarity  
 Not Adaptable to Interests of Other 
Organization 
 
Structure Impeding Rules or Policies + 
 Inadequate Authority of Participants + 
 Inadequate Resources  
 Lack of Accountability  
 Lack of Formal Roles or Procedures for 
Collaborating 
 
Lateral Mechanisms Lack of Familiarity with Other 
Organizations 
 
 Inadequate Communication and 
Information Sharing 
 
Incentives Competition for Resources  
 Territoriality  




Domains Barrier Factors Summer 
Storms 
2004 
People Practices Lack of Competency  
 Arrogance, Hostility, Animosity  
7. Other Factors 
1.)  Leadership.  The report noted that the leadership within Florida 
was highly experienced with emergency management by the time of the 2004 season of 
storms.  Governor Bush had been in office for his first term and had already led the state 
through several crises to include wildfires, the 9-11 attacks, with subsequent Florida 
National Guard mobilizations and deployments, and previous hurricane seasons, albeit 
not of the same magnitude as the 2004 season.  W. Craig Fugate had been the Director 
for the Division of Emergency Management for several years and was likewise highly 
experienced.  Leaders of other state agencies, such as the Florida National Guard and the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, were also all seasoned veterans of crisis 
situations.  Perhaps more significant was that these and others experienced the meta-
leadership that they portrayed by actively pursuing relationships with other agency 
leaders and working together closely.  
8. Conclusion 
Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that the Florida CDM enterprise’s collaborative 
capacity had reached a state of full maturity in 2004.  Collaborative processes 
implemented stemming from lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 combined 
with lessons learned from 12 years of emergencies, to include tornados, El Nino floods, 
previous hurricane seasons, several wildfire seasons and response to the 9-11 attacks had 
honed the state’s ability to respond to catastrophic events.  In addition, the state had 
conducted numerous combined training exercises that developed enhanced trust and 
interoperability between participating agencies.  The emergency support functions had 
developed into a more robust framework and the SERT had collectively grown more 
accustomed to collaboration between agencies. The collaborative process had become  
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normalized as a means of state response.  Social capital was extensive as the team had 
confidence in themselves and their competence.  Respect continued to be enhanced 
through success.   
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by discussing how topics identified in the literature review are 
related to and integrated with findings from my qualitative analysis of the three Florida 
events.  Section B, titled “Insights from the Literature Review” examines each ICC 
domain’s relationships in the context of known theories and concepts.  Section C, titled 
“Noted patterns of ICC in the Florida CDM Enterprise” discusses noted patterns specific 
to Florida’s building of ICC.  Section D, titled “Discussion and Examples of Noted 
Patterns” discusses the noted patterns with specific examples provided to illustrate these 
patterns and provides discussion of their significance.  Section E, titled 
“Recommendations” provides specific recommended actions developed as a result of this 
research and analysis effort. 
B. INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section examines general conclusions reached for each ICC domain of 
purpose, structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives and people practices.  These 
conclusions discuss the connection between many of the conceptual frameworks 
discussed in my literature review within the context of each ICC domains. 
1. Purpose   
The felt need to collaborate is influenced by Foster-Fishman’s et al. primary area 
of member capacity, described by attitudes, motivations and access.  A felt need to 
collaborate is dependent on both individual and organizational attitudes and motivations 
and the ability to access other organizational structures.  The second primary area of 
relationship capacity also plays a role in the felt need to collaborate—the ability to form 
strong interorganizational relationships.  The third primary area of organizational 
capacity also plays a role in the areas of strategic leadership and structural frameworks 
with clarification of roles and conflict resolution.  Senge’s second core discipline of 
mental models, as well as Schein’s cognitive redefinition, influence the felt need to 
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collaborate in that collaboration efforts can be cognitively redefined to demonstrate 
collaboration as a positive endeavor, as opposed to working independently.  Senge’s third 
core discipline of systems thinking can serve as an enabler for the felt need to collaborate 
by acknowledging that interorganizational collaboration is a complex adaptive system 
and that no one agency has all the answers in a shared problem space.  Senge’s fourth 
core discipline of building a shared vision influences the building of ICC; leaders and 
change agents can influence the felt need to collaborate by setting the need to collaborate 
as a shared interorganizational vision for the interagency team.  Senge’s creative tension 
is critical to the recognition of the space between the current reality and where the 
interorganizational’s vision is established in regards to the need to collaborate.  One 
component—defining the current reality—serves little purpose without also establishing 
a vision of where the team wants to go in the future.  The reverse paradigm, establishing 
a vision without acknowledging the current reality, is likely to fail.  Organizational 
friction may be a restraining factor for establishing a felt need to collaborate in that 
leaders spend an inordinate amount of time and energy working to alleviate friction 
points and not working to solve core problems in the complex system.  Imagine the likely 
low returns of success if an interagency effort addresses only organizational friction 
caused by unclear information during an event, as an example of how organizational 
friction may serve as a barrier to addressing the overall core system’s problems. 
Having common goals is similar to felt need to collaborate.  Foster-Fishman’s 
three areas of  member capacity, relationship capacity and organizational capacity all 
influence having common goals in that attitudes, motivations, the ability to form strong 
relationships, leadership influence, conflict resolution and developing structural 
frameworks  strengthen or diminish the establishment of common goals in an interagency 
setting.  Senge’s second core discipline of mental models and fourth core discipline of 
building a shared vision heavily influence the interagency efforts to establish common 
goals.    
Willingness to address other agencies’ interests or cross-agency goals versus local 
organizational goals and formalized structure for coordination are again influenced by all 
three of Foster-Fishman’s primary areas of member capacity, relationship capacity and 
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organizational capacity.  Senge’s core discipline of mental models and systems deeply 
influence the ability of individuals and organizations to enter into new paradigms of 
thinking how interorganizational coordination structures and frameworks should be 
developed and institutionalized for building collaborative capacity.  Primary to this effort 
is cognitive redefining of what success looks like—is success measured by what a single 
organization or stakeholder is able to accomplish individually or is it measured by what 
the system as a whole accomplishes in the pursuit of a collective and collaborative effort?  
2. Structure   
Structure is heavily influenced by organizational capacity in that leaders 
transform individual interests into a dynamic collective force, establish formalized 
procedures that clarify staff and member roles and provide clear guidelines for decision 
making, establish methods to deal with conflict resolution, develop functional internal 
communication systems that promote information sharing and problem discussion and 
resolution, provide human and financial resources and a continuous learning organization 
to consistently seek and respond to feedback.  The establishment of structure serves to 
reduce organizational friction in an interagency collaborative effort and diminishes the 
potential for conflict by setting clear roles and expectations.  Senge’s third core discipline 
of systems thinking is centric to success in this area; participants become more cognizant 
that their actions have consequences for other components—other agencies and 
stakeholders—in the complex interdependent system.  Structure is heavily dependent on 
strategic leadership; leaders provide authority for actions and decision-making, resources 
to facilitate success and establish clear roles for participants to enable decentralized 
decision making and develop participant’s capabilities.  These factors are all especially 
critical in an interagency collaborative effort as participants may enter into new 
relationships with a lack of clarity for their roles and decision-making authority. 
3. Lateral Mechanisms   
The Lateral Mechanisms domain within the building of ICC is influenced by 
members’ core skills, internal and external relationships and organizational capacity to 
share information.   Technical interoperability and combined training exercises are 
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heavily dependent on organizational capacity in the category of strategic leadership and 
providing resources for organizational efficiency.  Feedback loops are especially critical 
for organizations to grow in the area of organizational capacity.  All five of Senge’s core 
disciplines influence this domain.  Personal mastery of core skills for independent 
lifelong learning strengthens the system’s capacity for team learning.  Goldratt’s Theory 
of Constraints, which highlights that the weakest link in a chain impedes the entire 
system, is relevant, in this domain, in that success and barrier factors, such as technical 
interoperability and combined training exercises illustrate that a weak link hinders the 
effectiveness of the entire system.  Senge’s second core discipline of mental models is 
relevant in that effective information sharing is dependent on how we view this cognitive 
ability.  Senge’s third core discipline of a systems approach to organizational learning is 
relevant in ICC factors such as information sharing and combined training exercises.  His 
fourth discipline of building a shared vision influences the ICC factors—an example is in 
the factor of combined training exercises.  Exercises that only place agencies in a 
collaborative environment serve limited purpose if there is no shared vision for what the 
exercises are intended to actually accomplish.  Senge’s fifth core discipline of team 
learning is especially influential in this ICC domain.  Combined training exercises, as an 
example, should seek to build a team learning environment as opposed to the exercise 
serving to only teach one component agency or section lessons, while other components 
serve only as facilitators.  Senge envisioned team learning as the pinnacle to strive for 
where teams seek to approach learning as a continuous cycle of generative knowledge 
building.  The feedback cycle is a central tenet to this approach in that the focus is on the 
process as opposed to a final destination.     
4. Incentives   
The incentive domain of building ICC is influenced by Foster-Fishman’s areas of 
organizational capacity.  Strategic leadership is especially influential in this domain.  
Leaders create the environment where collaboration is rewarded through incentives such 




restructuring the ways that organizations view collaborative efforts and by treating the 
entire system as a problem space to utilize collaboration as a means to solve problems 
and make decisions.   
5. People Practices   
The People Practices of building ICC is dependent upon Foster-Fishman’s 
relationship capacity, both internal and external.  Relationships facilitate 
interorganizational collaborative capacity by developing an environment for collaboration 
based on mutual respect and tolerance.  Senge’s core disciplines of personal mastery 
effect this ICC domain; people who are focused on developing their own learning, as a 
lifelong goal, recognize their own shortcomings and approach relationships with others 
with empathy and respect toward the other people and organizations, with a sense of 
striving to build collective learning.  Senge viewed personal mastery as a prerequisite for 
team learning to develop and flourish.  Personal mastery and team learning act as a hedge 
against organizational friction by maintaining a goal of continuous improvement based 
on reducing the creative tension gap between our current reality and our vision of where 
we want to be in the future.  The goal of closing this creative tension gap reduces 
organizational friction by better preparing participants for the unforeseen circumstances 
and events that can hinder organizational efficiency.  Since the very nature of emergency 
management and domestic security is preparing for an unforeseen future, this approach is 
paramount for success within the shared problem space.   
As we have discussed, Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints examines how a chain is 
only as strong as its weakest link.  Hence, TOC can be viewed in the context of this 
research project as a potential restraining force—or barrier factor for building ICC—that 
should be considered for possible impediment of building ICC.  If we consider TOC as a 
potential force that can harm networks of collaboration, then a clear implication for 
leaders and change agents is to focus change efforts on strengthening these forces of 
concern.  An example might be in the ICC factor of impeding policies. Success factors 
for building ICC may be strong but the barrier factor of impeding policies may be such a 
deterrent to success that it overshadows success factors. This could be a weak link in the 
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system as viewed by Goldratt’s TOC and would hinder the entire systems potential for 
building collaborative capacity.  Leaders considering TOC in their use of Lewin’s Force 
Field Analysis may be well served to not view all restraining factors as of equal 
importance.   
Organizational friction has been discussed as unforeseen events that cause leaders 
to devote significant time and resources toward decision making in an uncertain 
environment.  Complex adaptive systems have a high likelihood of being impacted by the 
forces of organizational friction and there may be little that can be done to eliminate these 
forces.  However, developing mental models that view these frictions as challenges to be 
overcome in a systems and team learning approach can change the way organizations 
view these circumstances as they develop.  Information in the comprehensive disaster 
management environment is a precious, and not always present, commodity available to 
leaders and participants, but developing systems that facilitate ICC success factors can do 
much to mitigate the ill effects of organizational friction.  Establishing an environment of 
mutual trust and respect establishes a generative learning environment that views 
organizational friction and the fog of homeland security as unintended consequences of 
the changing environment, and seeks to adapt the systems to meet this changing 
environment without attempting to place organizational or individual blame, will succeed 
where others may fail.  General George Marshall, viewed by many as the central architect 
for the Allied Forces’ success in World War II, stated, “fix the problem and not the 
blame.”  This is not to say that personal accountability should not be an organizational 
goal, but organizational friction does suggest that often forces beyond any individual’s or 
organization’s control create unintended consequences that impact success, especially in 
a highly dynamic and changing environment such as disaster management.   
C. NOTED PATTERNS OF ICC IN THE FLORIDA CDM ENTERPRISE  
This section of the chapter identifies patterns that are of significance in the 
development of collaborative capacity for the Florida Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Enterprise, provides specific examples, and explains why these patterns are 
significant.   
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1. ICC Success Factors Increased over the 12-Year Period 
The first major pattern that is worthy of note is that the indication of success 
factors for interorganizational collaborative capacity increased over the period of 12 
years that was analyzed; there were nine success factors noted for Hurricane Andrew in 
1992,  nine  success factors for Firestorm 1998 and 15 for Season of Storms 2004.  The 
reasons for the Hurricane Andrew success factors and the Firestorm 1998 being the same 
number and then an increase in the number of success factors in 2004 are not 
immediately clear, but the following possible reasons are provided for consideration.  
Many of the success factors were instituted by the state in strategic initiatives that 
involved legislative efforts that took a period of several years to actually implement and 
normalize.  As one example, funding resources for emergency management were 
instituted, but it took several years to fully realize the benefits.  EMAC strategies were 
also initiated, but took a period of years to fully set into place and the benefits to become 
apparent.  Training exercises were also increased, but the benefits of interagency training 
may not have been immediately apparent within the first few years.  Of significance is 
that the firestorms were also an emergency management event that was not faced on a 
large state scale until the 1998 fire season, while hurricanes and other weather events 
happened on a more frequent occurrence during the period.  Technology is another area 
where the desire was present but the means were not fully available, Communication 
interoperability is a striking example where it was recognized that a requirement was 
present but the actual systems to meet the requirement were still in developmental stages.  
It is a matter of subjective hypothesis, but it is also possible that setting into place 
strategic initiatives for strengthening collaborative capacity, in itself, does not mean that 
increased collaborative capacity will occur in a period of even a few years, and may take 
a longer period of years to fully mature, as a result of increased social capital and other 
factors that mature over time.  If this hypothesis is accurate, it has profound significance 
for United States homeland security efforts as we have just now just reached the tenth 
anniversary of the 9-11 attacks on America.   
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Figure 4.   Increase of Florida CDM Enterprise ICC Success Factors 1992–2004 
2. ICC Barrier Factors Decreased over the 12-Year Period  
The second noted pattern of significance is the reduction of barrier factors during 
the 12-year period of analysis—ten barrier factors were noted in the Hurricane Andrew 
period, eight barrier factors in the Wildfires 1998 period and three in the Summer of 
Storms 2004 period.  A hypothesis might be made that the elimination of barrier factors 
requires fewer resources to implement than the initiation of success factors.  Many of the 
restraining factors suggest elimination of existing barriers, such as impeding rules or 
policies or territoriality as opposed to adding new systems.  If this hypothesis is accurate, 
this is significant and good news as America faces economic challenges and diminishing 
resources; reduced resources does not, by itself, mean that building collaborative capacity 
in interorganizational efforts is not possible, albeit to a lesser degree, should resources be 
made available for building collaborative capacity. 
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Figure 5.   Decrease Of Florida CDM Enterprise ICC Barrier Factors 1992–2004 
3. Florida Leaders Capitalized on Lessons Learned From Each Event  
The third noted pattern of significance is that Florida leaders capitalized on 
lessons learned from each event, which in itself is indicative of the importance of 
capturing lessons learned and using them to leverage success factors and eliminate or 
reduce barrier factors.  It can be argued that the ICC domain framework used in this 
project is an effective means of analyzing lessons learned for future events.  An action 
research question asked by Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen58 is how can leaders use (ICC) 
survey results to assess interorganizational collaborative capacity?  The methodology 
used in this project may be one example of the use of the already established ICC success 
and barrier factors developed by Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen.  Many after-action reports 
and lessons learned are currently developed at the single agency level, while the actual 
events they assess are interorganizational collaborative efforts in nature.  By utilizing 
ICC domains as a framework for assessing interorganizational success and weaknesses 
during after-action reviews and lessons learned summits, leaders and change agents can 
capitalize on lessons learned using a complex systems approach as opposed to only 
reviewing individual components (single agencies) efforts. 
                                                 
58Hocevar, Susan, Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity: A Conceptual Model and 
Measurement Tool, February 24, 2010, 
https://www.chds.us/?file&mode=dl&f=resources/uapi/summit10/Track2/Hocevar-Interorganizational-
Collaborative-Capacity-02-031510-01.pdf (accessed August 21, 2011). 
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4. ICC Success and Barrier Factors Are Often Both Present During 
Different Stages of Events 
The fourth noted pattern in this analysis is that often success and barrier factors 
that have linkage are both present.  Readers may have already noted that sometimes this 
occurred in this analysis.  This could be the result of time periods during an event—a 
barrier may have been present early on during an event and leaders noted the barrier and 
took corrective actions to eliminate or reduce it, which caused it to become a success 
factor later in the same event.  Examples may include information sharing or 
communication, technical interoperability or available resources.  This dynamic suggests 
another use of the developed ICC domains—use during an event as a measurement tool.  
By using the ICC success and barrier factors as a checklist to assess ongoing operations, 
leaders can assess how their interorganizational collaborative efforts are working prior to 
the conclusion of the event.  Assignment of quality control personnel to assess ICC 
during an event may help leverage and expedite the building of ICC for 
interorganizational success.  
In addition to the time dynamic, the presence of both correlating success and 
barrier factors during the same event could be the result of different agencies having 
differing levels of ICC as a result of procedures and structures.  One agency may be 
experiencing success in an area while another agency may have barriers impeding 
success.  By using the ICC domains as a method of benchmarking smart practices in ICC 
development, leaders and change agents may be able to enhance overall ICC systems 
success.  Use of the ICC domains could be leveraged as incentives to assess individual 
agencies and provide cross-agency information sharing of ICC success factors.      
5. There is a Correlation Between Perceived Success of the Florida CDM 
Enterprise During the 12-Year Period with the ICC Model of Success 
and Barrier Factors 
The fifth noted pattern in this analysis is that the Florida CDM enterprise 
perceived success over the period of analysis correlates to the ICC model of success and 
barrier factors.  Florida CDM efforts were viewed as unremarkable, even by many of the 
participants during Hurricane Andrew response efforts, and were viewed as successful 
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during the Season of Storms 2004.  This strongly suggests that the building of ICC during 
the 12 years between these two events was, at least partly, an enabler for overall success 
of the Florida CDM efforts.   
6. Participants in Florida CDM Efforts During the 12 Years of Analysis 
May Not Have Been Cognizant of the Importance of the Building of 
ICC as a Success Enabler for Change Efforts  
The sixth noted pattern in this analysis is that the actual participants in the Florida 
CDM efforts were perhaps not cognizant of the importance of building the ICC as a 
success enabler for their own change efforts.  Throughout all three reports, use of the 
term “collaborative capacity” was absent in the narratives.  Some of the language and 
many of the actions taken strongly suggest that there was an intuitive search for enhanced 
interagency cooperation, which is indicative of the emotional intelligence of the 
participants, in that they were able to ascertain what would strengthen their individual 
agency efforts was to cooperate with other agencies.  The implication is that by being 
cognizant of the building of ICC as a success enabler, future leaders and change agents 
can further facilitate overall system successes by undertaking more deliberate design 
strategies, using ICC domains as a systems design parameter. 
7. Perceived Problems Later Became Success Enablers 
The seventh pattern noted is that often, what appears to be a problem when it first 
occurs can later become a success enabler.  We have already discussed how the aftermath 
of Hurricane Andrew served as a wake-up call to galvanize Florida’s leaders to develop a 
new model of emergency management.  Likewise, we have discussed that the 9-11 
attacks served as a catalyst for changes in the federal interorganizational collaborative 
environment.   
8. Florida Adopted a Whole-of-Government Approach as a Means to 
Address A Complex Problem   
The eighth noted pattern of significance in the Florida Disaster narrative is the 
whole-of-government approach taken by Florida.  Partnerships between the 
government—whether local, state or federal—with public and private organizations is 
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essential in ensuring unity of effort for all phases of emergency management and 
domestic security.  Implicit in this approach is the importance of information sharing and 
public information methodologies to assist in taking a team approach to emergency 
situations.  It is possible that Florida planners understand this dynamic, partly as a result 
of the experiences of the state during World War II—the use of Civil Air Patrol and other 
volunteers was integral to the response in protecting the state’s vast coastline from 
German submarine attacks and the threat of spies landing on the Florida shoreline.    
It is noted that Florida did not assess their own ICC, using survey tools prior to 
the period of analysis.  This would have provided a starting point to ascertain the strength 
and weaknesses of ICC within the interagency domain prior to measurement after 
specific events.  Others who intend to utilize ICC domains for assessing their own 
strengths and weaknesses would be well served to conduct surveys before events happen 
to determine a common operating picture.   
9. Disasters and Emergencies Take Many Forms That Require Robust 
and Flexible Response Capabilities  
The ninth noted pattern of significance is the many forms that disasters and 
emergencies can take and the need for a robust and flexible response capability.  The 
Florida Comprehensive Disaster Management Enterprise has evolved tremendously over 
the years since Hurricane Andrew made landfall in South Florida in September 1992.  
Florida has provided an example of how many different forms emergencies can take—
hurricanes, tropical storms, tornados, floods, wildfires, riots, evacuees from adjacent 
island nations, anthrax attacks, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill environmental disaster, 
support for the 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster and other lesser-known events are all 
woven into the Florida disaster narrative.  Since 1994, the Florida State Emergency 
Response Team has been an integral component in preparation, response, recovery and 
mitigation efforts for these types of emergencies and has made tremendous progress in its 
capacity to provide emergency relief for the state.  This project has made an attempt to 
demonstrate that a large portion of the reason for its success to date has been in the 
building of interorganizational collaborative capacity.  The Florida SERT has been highly 
involved in the development of the EMAC concept to strengthen ICC between agencies 
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from different states.  Florida SERT has also participated in international relief and 
training exercises with adjacent island nations in the Caribbean.  This is significant in that 
Florida and the islands of the Caribbean share so many of the same threats—catastrophic 
storms and drug smuggling being two noteworthy examples.  
10. Strategic Leadership Influenced ICC Domains 
The tenth noted pattern of significance in this discussion is the role of leadership 
in building ICC. For almost all ICC success and barrier factors, leaders set the tone for 
ICC development within the ICC environment.  Leaders provide the ICC domains of 
purpose, structure, lateral mechanisms and incentives, while serving as role models for 
people practices.   
D. DISCUSSION AND EXAMPLES OF NOTED PATTERNS  
This section discusses how the noted patterns may be inter-related in the context 
of building an interorganizational collaborative capacity within the state of Florida.  I 
conclude with why the patterns and their relationships are significant in the narrative of 
building ICC within the Florida CDM enterprise. 
1. ICC Success Factors Increased over the 12-Year Period  
The first identified major pattern is important in that it supports the hypothesis 
that the increase of ICC success factors supports the building of ICC in a complex 
system.  The following specific examples from the analysis are provided to demonstrate 
how the increase in these success factors may occur in a complex system.   
Felt need to collaborate was noted as a success factor in all three examined 
Florida events: Hurricane Andrew 1992, Wildfires 1998 and Summer Storms 2004.  The 
felt need to collaborate was initially established as a result of Hurricane’s Andrew 
aftermath when leaders and participants recognized that a single agency approach did not 
work effectively in such a complex environment as a catastrophic event.  This realization 
could arguably be viewed as the most dominant narrative in the Hurricane Andrew report, 
with statements such as the need for state agencies to work more closely with county and 
private organizations to develop a more comprehensive emergency management 
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framework for cooperation.  Smallen and Leach59 make the case that a felt need to 
collaborate is the most important precondition for the success of collaboration, and that 
the need may be driven simply by survival, such as was manifested in the animal 
kingdom.  The negative media publicity received as a result of the perceived poor 
immediate response efforts, after the landfall of Hurricane Andrew in south Florida, may 
have served as a trigger to create a commonly felt need to collaborate within the Florida 
agencies.  No single agency appeared to be blamed for the poor response efforts; the 
negative response was pointed towards the entire state government, which served to 
create a shared sense of mission failure.  So how do we account for the continued felt 
need to collaborate during the wildfires of 1998 and the summer of storms in 2004?  
Smallen and Leach may provide an answer to this question when they state that the felt 
need to collaborate can be a human response to dealing with uncertainty, which is an 
almost constant presence in the field of emergency management and in complex adaptive 
systems.   
Another example of success factors in the three analyzed Florida events is in the 
factor of social capital.  This factor was not noted as present in the Hurricane Andrew 
report, but was noted as a success factor for wildfires 1998 and summer storms 2004.  
This factor’s increase can be attributed to the building of relationships and trust over 
time.  Social capital is increased as agencies succeed—and sometimes fail—together in 
both operations and exercises.  Exercises play an integral role in providing a safe place 
for failure, with limited consequences for failure.  Social capital is about the value of 
social networks and bonding similar people, as well as bridging between diverse people 
with norms of reciprocity.  The establishment of the Florida State Emergency Response 
Team in 1994 and subsequent creation of SERT logos and uniforms, such as shirts, 
facilitated the building of social capital.  People involved in the creation and development 
of the F-SERT built social capital as they worked closer together in training, operations 
and exercises.  Simply knowing who to call when action was required developed social 
                                                 
59 Smallen, David and Leach, Karen, “Making a Nicer Transition to the Millennium: Five Keys to 
Successful Collaboration,” Educom Review 34, no. 4 (August 1999), 
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/html/erm/erm99/erm9945.html (accessed November 14, 2011). 
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capital; senior leaders modeled behavior for their subordinates and reinforced norms and 
organizational culture to nurture the collaborative environment.  
2. ICC Barrier Factors Decreased over the 12-Year Period  
The second noted pattern of significance is a corresponding pattern to the first 
noted pattern of increased ICC success factors.  Confidence builds as success factors 
become more prevalent, which facilitates the reduction of ICC barrier factors.  Barrier 
factors are often rooted in the dynamics of intergroup behavior; Caruso, Rogers and 
Bazerman60 note that three common barriers to collaboration are intergroup bias, group 
territoriality and poor negotiation norms. 
An example of a barrier factor in the evolution of the Florida CDM Enterprise is 
in the factor of territoriality, which was noted as a barrier in the analysis of both the 
Hurricane Andrew 1992 report and the Wildfires 1998 report.  Territoriality, as defined 
by Caruso, Rogers and Bazerman, is rooted in the concept of psychological ownership, 
whereas groups within organizational boundaries tend to establish territory for their own 
group’s physical space, ideas, activities, roles, issues and information and tend to become 
possessive and form territorial attachments to such objects.  This behavior stems from the 
need to respect and reaffirm the identity, efficiency and security of the group within the 
interorganizational effort.  This concept could explain why territoriality appeared to be an 
area of concern within Florida CDM Enterprise efforts for early events such as Hurricane 
Andrew and Wildfires 1998.  As an example of why this could be an area of concern, 
response to hurricanes, tornados and floods is commonly viewed as primarily a Florida 
Division of Emergency Management realm while wildfires is commonly viewed as a 
Florida Division of Forestry realm, and domestic security is commonly viewed as a 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement realm.  Territoriality—whether in the physical 
space for incident commands or the roles and activities of these agencies—can easily 
become a barrier for interagency information sharing and communication.  Storage of 
information and data is a classic example of how organizations tend to become territorial, 
                                                 
60 Caruso, Heather, Rogers, Todd and Bazerman, Max H., Boundaries Need Not be Barriers: Leading 
Collaboration Among Groups in Decentralized Operations, Harvard Business School, 2008, 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-090.pdf (accessed November 14, 2011).  
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often without being cognizant of it themselves.  Groups may not even make attempts to 
access other available interagency information and may use markings, such as 
organizational logos or letterheads to establish territory.        
3. Florida Leaders Capitalized on Lessons Learned From Each Event 
The third noted pattern of significance is important in that learning organizations 
seek continual improvement and establish feedback loops.  We have discussed creative 
tension as the space between current reality and the vision for the future.  Use of after-
action reviews and the capture of lessons learned are indicative of a learning organization 
that seeks lifelong learning and continuous improvement.  Learning organizations never 
stop reinventing themselves with cyclic information patterns that continually improve the 
process. The United States Army Field Manual on Leadership notes that “leaders who 
learn look at the experience and find better ways of doing things.  It takes courage to 
create a learning environment.  Leaders dedicated to a learning environment cannot be 
afraid to challenge how they and their organization operate.  When leaders question why 
do we do it this way and find out the only reason is, because we’ve always done it that 
way, it is time for a closer look at this process.”61 Donahue and Tuohy62 note that 
emergency responders use various mechanisms of sharing performance information in 
order to prevent the recurrence of adverse events and actions and to better contend with 
situations and problems that are likely to arise again.  They also note that the U.S. 
Army’s After-Action Review (AAR), a comprehensive reflective learning process 
developed in the 1970s, is one of the most widely used methods.  These researchers point 
out that, unfortunately, lessons are not always learned, and experience suggests that many 
problems and mistakes are repeated in subsequent events.  The Florida CDM experience 
in the building of ICC suggests that this was not typically the case as the ICC success 
factors increased over the 12-year period analyzed, while the ICC barrier factors 
decreased. 
                                                 
61 Schoomaker, Peter J., Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, 
Carlise, PA: United States Army, 2006), 8-2 and 8-3. 
62 Donoghue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn.” 
 91 
4. ICC Success and Barrier Factors Are Often Both Present During 
Different Stages of Events 
The fourth noted pattern in this analysis is indicative of Lewin’s work in Force 
Field Analysis.  Lewin believed that the field of forces—what he described as life 
space—driving individuals or groups of individuals towards a goal, or hindering their 
progress toward a goal, was constantly changing based on time and experience.  What 
may be a success factor during one stage of an event may become a barrier later in the 
event, or vice versa, depending on changing constructs in the minds of participants.  
These mental constructs, when fully constructed, serve as a constellation of motives, 
ideals, values, anxieties, needs and moods.  Lewin proposed that people make sense of 
their complex world—physical, mental and social—through continuous interaction 
between memories, desires, goals and their environment.  Within a complex adaptive 
system, such as the Florida CDM Enterprise, organizations and individuals bring a wide 
range of these driving and restraining forces, based on organizational motives, ideals, 
values anxieties, needs and moods.  The forces involved are in a constant state of 
dynamic equilibrium; the individual parts influence the whole.  Leaders are well served to 
recognize that the forces involved shift based on time and experience.  As different stages 
of an event unfold, the success and barrier factors evolve based on circumstances.  
Communication between leaders and participants, during stages of events, may serve to 
sustain success factors and alleviate barrier factors.  Leaders can help participants to 
continue forming mental constructs that place events into perspective.   
An example in the analysis of the three Florida reports, where both success and 
barrier factors are present, is in the domain of structure.  Instances of both adequate and 
inadequate authorities were noted in the Summer of Storms report.  This, at first glance 
may appear inconsistent, but not if viewed in the time and experience context previously 
mentioned.  Authorities between Florida participants as well as between Florida and other 
states appeared adequate.  Federal and state authorities specifically between Florida and 
the Department of Defense Northern Command (NORTHCOM) appeared at times to be 
confusing but have since been addressed through the practice of Dual Status Command.  
The mental construct of the Florida SERT, at the time, was that they had developed a 
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framework that had been successful for previous emergency events and neither the formal 
structures nor informal mental constructs of adding a new stakeholder into the existing 
command structure had yet been fully developed.  Another example of both success and 
barrier factors being present was in the domain of purpose; both the success factor of 
willingness to address other agencies interests or cross-agency goals, versus local 
organizations goals and the barrier factor of focus on regional or local agency concerns, 
were noted in both the Hurricane Andrew and Wildfires 1998 reports.  In this 
circumstance, the experience and mental constructs of the Florida emergency 
management participants influenced the outcome.  While a felt need to collaborate 
influenced the success factor, the Florida Emergency Management paradigm, of focusing 
response efforts at the county level, created this mental model in the minds of 
participants.  Which stage of the emergency management cycle was being implemented 
influenced the success and barrier factors present.  During response efforts, a focus on 
local organizations goals was viewed by state participants as a healthy mental construct 
that followed the existing paradigm and was in line with the statutes governing Florida 
emergency management.    
5. There is a Correlation Between Perceived Success of the Florida CDM 
Enterprise During the 12-Year Period with the ICC Model of Success 
and Barrier Factors 
The fifth noted pattern in this analysis suggests that ICC is an integral component 
for successful comprehensive disaster management efforts.  We have already noted how 
many emergency management professionals viewed Florida’s emergency management 
efforts in the 2004/2005 hurricane season as a model of leadership in the field.  One has 
to wonder if that view could have been established had the building of ICC not happened 
during the same period.  The building of ICC may not have been the only reason for 
Florida’s perceived success, but the findings of this research effort suggest that it 
contributed to success.  An example of how collaboration efforts contributed to the 
success of Florida’s CDM Enterprise is found in the book Megacommunities63 when 
discussing Florida’s change effort following the impact of Hurricane Andrew.  The 
                                                 
63 Gerencser et al., Megacommunities.  
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author states that it was now clear to Florida’s leaders that no government agency could 
manage this type of large-scale catastrophe on its own, so Florida moved to a new 
approach, deliberately involving a variety of organizations—public sector, corporate, 
non-governmental and faith-based in its emergency planning and activities.  This meant 
changing both the planning process and the relationships among these various groups.       
6. Participants in Florida CDM Efforts During the 12 Years of Analysis 
May Not Have Been Cognizant of the Importance of the Building of 
ICC as a Success Enabler for Change Efforts 
The sixth noted pattern in this analysis is indicative of the relative new paradigm 
of interorganizational collaborative capacity.  While the term “collaboration,” itself, has 
been present for many years, the recognition of the importance of an overall systems 
approach in the building of ICC is a relatively recent phenomenon.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School ICC Research Project commenced in 2002 and the 9-11 attacks on 
the United States served as a catalyst for wider recognition that a new model for 
interagency cooperation was needed, particularly in the area of communication and 
information sharing.  Entrenched paradigms of stove-piping  information was perceived 
by many in the United States as a reason for lack of adequately anticipating the 9-11 
attacks and new models of interorganizational effectiveness were aggressively pursued.  
Florida leaders obviously recognized the need for more collaborative efforts after the 
Hurricane Andrew event, but did not have the benefit of an ICC model to use for 
reframing the structure and mental constructs.  It is a testimony to their resourcefulness 
and ingenuity in developing a successful interagency framework that was, in actuality, 
years ahead of its time.   
7. Perceived Problems Later Became Success Enablers 
The seventh pattern noted is related to mental constructs and how leaders frame 
shared problems.  An example noted in a 1997 case study of Florida emergency 
management examined during this research effort is that the unexpected Florida winter 
storm of 1993 provided a catalyst for strengthening the felt need to collaborate within 
Florida.  The vast area of Florida impacted within the North and Central Florida area of 
the state demonstrated to legislators and the public that the entire state was vulnerable to 
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storms of this nature, and provided a felt need to provide resources for emergency 
management within the state.  Yet, this catalyst for change is not noted in any of the 
examined reports and is seldom discussed within the Florida CDM Enterprise storyline.  
This potential for unforeseen events is relevant in the American homeland security 
enterprise of the 21st century.  Although specific areas may be more likely to experience 
certain events—acts of terrorism or earthquakes as examples—it doesn’t mean that the 
events may not also occur in less likely areas.  Leaders and change agents provide 
meaning and context to events as they unfold and set the tone for how circumstances are 
viewed within the collaborative environment.  Recall from our literature review how Boal 
and Schultz64 argue that strategic leaders play a crucial role in moving organizations to an 
environment of organizational learning and adaption by storytelling and dialogue, which 
shape the interactions and construct the shared meanings that provide the rationale by 
which the past, the present and the future of the organization come together.  Leaders, 
such as former Governor Bush, have developed this storyline within Florida by 
discussing publicly how Hurricane Andrew served as a wake-up call to Floridians and 
caused a change in thinking on how to respond to such catastrophic events.  Another 
example of this pattern in the Florida CDM narrative is how the widespread devastation 
of the 1998 Wildfires caused Florida leaders to consider how to manage such widespread 
devastation across the entire state, practices set into place for this and subsequent wildfire 
events served to help manage statewide devastation during the Summer of Storms in 
2004, when all 67 state counties were impacted enough to receive disaster declarations.   
8. Florida Adopted a Whole of Government Approach as a Means to 
Address a Complex Problem 
The eighth noted pattern of significance is related to the felt need to collaborate, 
likely triggered by a sense of, “We’re all in this together.”  The devastation caused by 
Hurricane Andrew had never been viewed before on television, and Florida, as a whole 
received negative media reporting, much as Louisiana would experience in 2005 
following Hurricane Katrina.  The whole-of-government approach to emergency 
                                                 
64 Boal. and Schultz, “Storytelling, Time, and Evolution,” 411–418.   
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management, used by Florida, featured horizontal and vertical collaboration between 
agencies and provided citizens with one-stop shopping for accessing information and 
contact information.  A single State Coordinating Officer reporting directly to the 
Governor, with the authority to task and commit all state resources, is centric to this 
approach, and having a central hub for website access and communication is also 
invaluable in support of this approach within the Florida CDM environment.   A whole-
of-government approach is noteworthy in the Florida ICC experience with alleviating 
impeding policies and procedures, such as the example of developing means to address 
wildfire fuel issues, in the context of balancing the need to provide wildfire barrier areas 
while also balancing land management and environmental concerns.  There are many 
other examples where the whole-of-government approach for comprehensive disaster 
management becomes a vital component for success.  Security during catastrophic events 
is one such example where interorganizational collaboration becomes critical. A large 
portion of security forces are provided by the Florida National Guard, but they operate 
under the legal umbrella of state police agencies, such as the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement or Florida Highway Patrol.  The Florida Department of Transportation 
becomes vital for roadway access issues, the Florida Wildlife Commission has a role in 
maritime security, and other agencies may provide support in various circumstances.  
Clearly, no individual agency can provide security during a catastrophic event without 
collaborating with other agencies in a whole-of-government approach.    
9. Disasters and Emergencies Take Many Forms That Require Robust 
and Flexible Response Capabilities 
The ninth noted pattern of significance relates primarily to the ICC domain of 
lateral mechanisms.  Social capital provides organizations with the ability to make 
changes to existing structure, as needs dictate, which is paramount for successfully 
providing adequate response in fluid and dynamic environments.  Technical 
interoperability provides a framework for communication and sharing of information, 
which facilitates incremental changes to keep up with changing circumstances.  Trust 
between agencies in order to react rationally and calmly to changing developments during 
emergency situations.  Examples during the Florida CDM Enterprise narrative include 
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how communication interoperability, based primarily on catastrophic storm impacts, also 
served to enhance interoperability during the Wildfires 1998 response.  Social capital 
built as a result of years of hurricane exercises facilitated the response to flood responses 
prior to the 1998 wildfires.  Combined training exercises conducted for RECON assets to 
conduct damage assessments and combined aviation exercises to practice wildfire 
suppression enabled the state, in 2010, to form an interagency task force of aviation 
RECON assets to assist in the Deepwater Horizon response.   
10. Strategic Leadership Influenced ICC Domains 
The tenth noted pattern of significance has many demonstrations in the Florida 
CDM Enterprise story.  Florida has been fortunate with great leadership in many 
prominent positions to include Governors, Division of Emergency Management Directors 
and Adjutant Generals.  These and other agency leaders promoted the interorganizational 
concepts and provided strategic leadership, which created an environment for building 
ICC within Florida’s CDM Enterprise.  No ICC success would have been possible in 
Florida without the support, vision and mega-leadership of these visionaries.  A specific 
example is the creation of the Lewis Commission following Hurricane Andrew response, 
and the creation of hundreds of combined training exercises over the past 20 years.  
Governor Bush attending all of the Florida National Guard annual state conferences 
during his eight years as Florida Governor, and addressing the crowd of officers, is an 
example how leadership can strengthen ICC by building social capital.  Leaders from the 
various Florida state agencies regularly attended combined training events and networked 
with other leaders, which sent clear signals for the expectation to collaborate throughout 
each organization. My own experiences in Florida emergency management efforts during 
the past 20 years lead me to state, without qualification, that Florida has been truly 
blessed with extraordinary leadership in emergency management, who envisioned Florida 
as a role model for emergency management and provided unprecedented support to 
develop collaborative capacity.  The Florida CDM enterprise has provided a striking 
example to other interested agencies for the utilization of ICC domains, categorized by 
success and barrier factors, for the building of ICC.  Figure 6 is a diagram depicting the 




Figure 6.   The Building Of Icc In The Florida Cdm Enterprise 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides recommendations for a path forward to utilize findings 
developed as a result of this research effort.  
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1. Conceptualize the Findings into a Briefing Format for Interested 
Stakeholders and Researchers 
We have discussed that communication and information sharing, both 
horizontally and vertically, is a driving force for building ICC.  Sharing these concepts in 
an interagency setting assists in establishing norms and incentives for continued progress 
in this area.  Much as we discussed how strategic leaders serve their organizations 
through storytelling and framing issues, sharing these results will act as a catalyst for 
developing vision for organizations, building renewed confidence for the participants of 
the actual events examined and developing expectations for new members. 
2. Examine Other Events in the Florida CDM Enterprise History for 
Further Development of How the Building of ICC Influences the 
Success of the Interagency Environment 
Possible past events, such as Florida’s contribution to the Hurricane Katrina 
response efforts in Mississippi and Louisiana, Florida’s contribution to the Haiti 
earthquakes response in 2010 and Florida’s contribution to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
oil platform crisis offer intriguing potential for examining how the building of ICC across 
state lines may have developed. 
3. Examine New Emergency Events that Happen in the Future, Using 
ICC Domains as a Framework 
This may be accomplished in Florida or other settings.  Efforts of this type may 
serve to continue to expand the body of knowledge for the building of ICC.  Likewise, 
using survey instruments to measure ICC success and barrier factors would provide more 
detailed information that may be leveraged by Florida leaders and change agents. 
4. Utilize the Findings of this Research in the Structuring of Future 
Combined Training Events 
If we accept the premise that the building of ICC served to strengthen the overall 
success of the Florida CDM Enterprise system, then it makes sense to further leverage 
these findings to develop frameworks for training and exercises that build upon the ICC 
success factors and mitigate the ICC barrier factors.  Knowledge gained does little to 
 99 
change or maintain desired actions and attitudes if not reinforced by institutionalizing and 
training the developed concepts at all levels of organizations.   
5. Continue to Expand the Practice of Conducting After-Action Reviews, 
and the Capturing of Lessons Learned, Using the Concept of the 
Building of ICC as a Framework of Analysis 
We have noted that much of the development of ICC within the Florida CDM 
Enterprise happened as a result of intuitive reasoning by leaders, change agents and 
participants.  Using the ICC domains as a framework for closely examining events, after 
they occur, provides a method for a more systematic evaluation of a desired outcome for 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This research demonstrates how the building of Interorganizational Collaborative 
Capacity served as an enabler for effective change efforts in Florida and constructs a 
narrative describing smart practices that may be leveraged by other professionals to 
enhance their own interorganizational collaborative capacity and efficiency efforts.    
Florida’s success may be viewed as a role model for development of ICC in other 
interorganizational efforts.  Florida leaders would likely be some of the first to point out 
that there have been setbacks along the journey.  Often, we learn more from our failures 
than we do our successes, and Hurricane Andrew illustrates this paradigm well.  As 
former Governor Bush once stated, Andrew was a wake-up call to all Floridians.  
Similarly 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina were wake-up calls for the United States.   
A. THE END OF THE STORY OR THE BEGINNING? 
This research effort has attempted to develop a storyline for the success of the 
Florida CDM Enterprise, from the period of initial change efforts as a result of Hurricane 
Andrew’s devastation of south Florida in 1992, through the statewide devastation of the 
Summer of Storms in 2004.  We have developed this storyline by using an existing 
framework for the building of Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity.  Florida has 
already experienced a myriad of emergency events since the 2004 hurricane season 
environmental crisis.  It is likely that more catastrophic events will continue to plague 
Florida in the years to come.  It is imperative that such a populated state continue to 
prepare for catastrophic events before they happen.  In a time of such economic malaise 
and budget constraints, it is likely that the resources available to Florida will be reduced, 
so creative and innovative means to develop increased capacities to collaborate become 
more necessary.  The use of systematic ICC frameworks to strengthen an already robust 
collaborative capacity is warranted, as Florida prepares for events such as the 2012 
Republican National Convention, to be conducted in Tampa during August 2012.  It is 
hoped that this research effort will provide another method and clues for the continuation 
of building interorganizational collaborative capacity within the Florida CDM Enterprise, 
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so that the Florida CDM Enterprise storyline continues to expand with successful smart 
practices that can be leveraged by Florida and other leaders in the Homeland Security 
Enterprise.  Figure 7 provides a Collaboration Maturity Model that suggests that a key to 
success for Florida will be to sustain collaborative efforts in a time of resource 
constraints. 
 
Figure 7.   Collaboration Maturity Model 
There are likely no panaceas or magic lamps to solve all homeland security 
friction issues or rid the homeland security environment of all fog. People bring their own 
human frailties with them and no threat or amount of perceived danger solves that 
paradigm. To return to Clausewitz one last time, he advocated in On War to keep pushing 
ahead with all one’s might to offset the friction of war that invariably results from human 
frailty. Homeland security must do the same.  The building of collaborative capacity 
within homeland security seeks to enhance the enterprise by building alliances that share 
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values and unity of effort towards a collective security environment.  The tsunami that 
struck the Japanese islands on March 12, 2011 serves as a recent and troubling reminder 
of the severe weather dangers for coastal states such as Florida, and the urgent need for 
sharing knowledge between state assets in order to strengthen the overall homeland 
security enterprise.  This project seeks to enable and facilitate the collection and research 
of tacit comprehensive disaster management and homeland security knowledge in Florida 
across the past two decades.  The rest of the story rests with leaders, change agents and 
participants within Florida’s Comprehensive Disaster Management Enterprise.  Florida 
has a history of rising to each new challenge and it is surmised that each new story will 
contain both high and low points with the turning of each new page, but the end of each 
new chapter will have happy endings for the residents of Florida as a result of the 
ingenuity, resourcefulness and creativity of all the characters in the story. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research efforts may build on this effort by conducting further study of 
collaborative capability building through the use of survey tools and interviews of 
organizational officials.  This research seeks to establish a checklist for collaboration in 
operations and training exercises as well as providing additional tools to assess 
collaborative capability posture within organizations.  Just as traffic signs based on past 
traffic experiences serve to more effectively guide converging traffic patterns, smart 
practices in the building of collaborative capacity serve as signposts to point the way 
toward more effective interagency collaboration as agencies merge together.   
Homeland security practitioners and national leaders may benefit from further 
research in building collaborative capacity.  Collaborative capacity building seeks to 
strengthen the human condition through the forces of building trust, knowledge, respect, 
leadership and other attributes that demonstrate mankind’s ability to work together to 
better its environment and provide collective security.  
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APPENDIX AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY AND PERSONAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
I have been an active participant in each of the 3 Florida events analyzed as well 
as many others with over a dozen activations for state emergencies including hurricanes, 
wildfires, floods and Y2K monitoring.  My experience includes: 
• serving  as an Operations Officer at both the Governor’s State Emergency 
Operations Center and the Adjutant General’s Joint Emergency Operations 
Center 
• serving as Officer In Charge for Rapid Impact Assessment Teams (RIATs) 
to assess and report infrastructure damage after catastrophic storms 
• instructing Emergency Operations Center management 
• coordinating and instructing search and rescue training 
• instructing  crisis decision making procedures 
• conducting maritime search and rescue/law enforcement patrols along 
storm damaged shorelines and rivers 
• designing and evaluating exercises for search and rescue and damage 
assessments 
• coordinating EMAC resources 
• coordinating resources for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
response and training 
• mobilization for Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
More importantly than what I have done is whom I’ve collaborated with as I have 
tremendously benefited from working with amazing personnel and agencies.  Everyone 
that we collaborate with shapes who we become.  I have conducted past research into the 
Pygmalion Effect phenomenon in which the greater the expectation placed upon people 
the better they perform.  I have benefited tremendously from mentors who have believed 
in my ability to succeed. 
My experiences over the past 29 years of service in support of federal and state 
emergencies leads  me to conclude  that 2 of our most important enablers for success are 
resilience and collaboration capacities and that the 2 are mutually supportive.  We are 
able to face adversity better as a group working together and collaboration increases our 
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collective resilience. We will face setbacks and challenges along the way—such is the 
human condition—but can continuously improve if we continue to collaborate.  Our 
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